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forum for thorough discussion of issues relevant to Christian thought 
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addresses those concerns and ideas across the curriculum which 
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with an accompanying computer disk copy when that is possible. 
Sermons, poetry and devotional materials are not used. Unsolicited 
manuscripts will not be returned unless a self-addressed envelope with 
sufficient postage is provided. Queries are welcome, and a style sheet 
is available upon request. Modest honorarium payments to authors 
follow acceptance. 
Articles in The Journal are indexed in The Christian Periodical 
Index and Religion Index One: Periodicals (RIO); book reviews are 
indexed in Index to Book Reviews in Religion (!BRR ). Both RIO and 
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41-) and The Asbury Seminarian (Vol. 1-40) are available from 
University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann 
Arbor, MI 48106. 
Articles and reviews may be copied for personal or internal use, and 
permission to reprint all or portions of any of the contents may be 
granted upon request to the managing editor. 
Subscriptions: One year (2 issues), 
$5.00 (outside the U.S. $8.00); 
Two years, $8.00 ($14.00); Three 
years, $11 .00 ($20.00). 
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! Editorial Note 
This Asbury Theological Journal is dedicated to Professor 
Robert A. Traina on the occasion of his retirement from the 
faculty of Asbury Theological Seminary. 
Professor Traina was born on August 27, 1921, in Chicago, the 
son of Italian immigrants. His father was a member of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church, but served as lay pastor to the Italian 
Mission Free Methodist Church in Melrose Park, Illinois. In this 
church Robert was nurtured in the Christian faith and first sensed 
the call to parish ministry at the age of 16. 
Professor Traina majored in religious studies and minored in 
Greek (classical and biblical) at Spring Arbor College and Seattle 
Pacific College. During these years his interest in biblical studies 
was kindled. While a student at Seattle Pacific, Professor Traina 
became aware of the program at The Biblical Seminary in New 
York; and in the fall of 1943 he and his new bride, Jane Odell, 
arrived in New York where he began his seminary education. 
The Biblical Seminary in New York, founded in 1900 by the 
Yale-educated Semitist Wilbert Webster White, had gained a 
worldwide reputation for the "inductive method" of the study of 
the English Bible. Courses in English Bible formed the center of 
the curriculum; the emphasis was upon the direct study of the 
Bible, and the goal was to allow the text to speak on its own 
terms, challenging all presuppositions and conforming the whole 
person to its message. Professor Traina found this approach to be 
a liberating experience. He had come to seminary, according to 
his own account, with a deductive personality, and the inductive 
approach changed his orientation to life and to the Bible. 
The Biblical Seminary emphasized effective and creative 
teaching, and professor Traina encountered there masters of the 
classroom, including Caroline Palmer, Dean Greer McKee, 
Howard Tillman Kuist (adjunct from Princeton Theological 
Seminary), and Edwin Lewis (adjunct from Drew Universi ty). 
Professor Traina excelled as a student at The Biblical Seminary, 
and the faculty, recognizing his extraordinary gifts, encouraged 
him to serve the church as a teacher in theological education. 
Indeed, they hired him as a member of the faculty upon his 
graduation from seminary. 
During his early years of teaching at The Biblical Seminary, 
Professor Traina became troubled at the lack of integration 
between English Bible and traditional exegesis. He judged that 
English Bible, as it was being taught at The Biblical Seminary, 
was not as comprehensive and specific as was needed to teach 
students effectively. Out of this concern, Professor Traina 
expanded and sharpened the method of English Bible. He 
developed it into an organized and comprehensive approach, 
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combining the unique f ea tu res of the inductive method as it had 
been taught over the years with the insights and tools of 
traditional exegesis. Professor Traina set forth his approach to 
inductive Bible study in his book, Methodical Bible Study, 
published in 1952. This book, translated into several languages, 
has been used in scores of colleges and seminaries around the 
world , and has served as the basis for many other works on Bible 
study. Its sales have averaged 2,500 copies a year. It would be 
difficult to overestimate the effect this book has had on the 
Church. 
In the early 1960s, The Biblical Seminary in New York 
experienced a time of transition , resulting in a radical change in 
the nature of the seminary itself. At this time, Professor Traina 
concluded that he could best minister elsewhere; and in 1966, 
having just earned his Ph.D. from Drew University, he accepted 
an invitation to join the faculty of Asbury Theological Seminary 
as a professor of English Bible. After serving as academic dean 
and vice president for academic administration from 1967 to 1975, 
he resumed full-time teaching in English Bible, from which he 
will retire at the end of the academic year 1987-88. 
In addition to Methodical Bible Study, Professor Traina's 
scholarly contributions include two chapters in Interpreting God 's 
Word for Today : An Inquiry into Hermeneutics from a Biblical 
Theological Perspecti ve. vol 11 , Warner Press, Anderson, IN, 1982, 
and articles in Baker's Dictionary of Christian Ethics, Baker Book 
House, Grand Rapids, MI, 1973, Christianity Today, and The 
Asbury S eminarian. He is currently engaged in writing a sequel to 
Methodical Bible Study. But Professor Traina's most enduring 
influence will no doubt be found in the lives and ministries of his 
students. 
The contributors to this issue of the Asbury Theological 
Journal have been chosen from among the most eminent of 
Professor Traina's teachers, colleagues and students. Dr. David L. 
McKenna, president of Asbury Theological Seminary, writes the 
tribute. Dr. William J. Abraham, a memeber of the faculty at 
Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, 
addresses the difficult issue of authorial intentionality in the 
interpretave process . Dr. Jerry H. Gill , associate professor of 
religious studies at the College of St. Rose in Albany, New York, 
and a widely recognized philosopher in his own right, contributes 
an article dealing with contemporary philosophical problems 
surrounding hermeneutics. Dr. Eugene Lemcio, professor of 
religion at Seattle Pacific University, explores the redaction of the 
"love commands" in the synoptic Gospels in the light of Pirke 
'Abot 1:2(3). Dr. Donald G . Miller, who has served on the 
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faculties of The Biblical Seminary in New York, Union 
Theological Seminary in Virginia and as president of Pittsburgh 
Theological Seminary, and whose impressive career includes major 
works in biblical studies, theology and preaching, offers a 
challenging discussion of the New Testament concept of "witness ." 
Finally, Dr. Robert W. Lyon, professor of New Testament 
interpretation at Asbury Theological Seminary, looks again at the 
interpretation of a crucial passage in the Gospel of John. 
It is my hope that this issue will serve as a worthy tribute to 
one of the great teachers in the Church. 
DA YID R. BAUER, Ptt.D . 
Guest Editor 
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Tribute to 
Robert A. Traina 
Teaching is a calling, a gift, a discipline and a ministry. When 
the Apostle Paul urged the Ephesians to live and work worthy of 
the particular grace which Christ Jesus had apportioned to them, 
he identified teachers as colleagues with apostles, prophets and 
evangelists and saw their common task, 
... to prepare God's people for works of service, so that the 
body of Christ may be built up until we all reach unity in 
the faith and in the knowledge of the Son of god and 
become mature, attaining to the whole measure of the 
fullness of Christ (Ephesians 4: 11-13, NIV). 
Robert Traina answered the call of God to teach and accepted 
the gift of teaching as his lifetime ministry. Consequently, he 
stands among apostles, prophets and evangelists as a colleague in 
the common task of preparing "God's people for the works of 
service." I am only one among multitudes who can witness to the 
influence of Dr. Traina's teaching, which has not only built the 
Body of Christ in the unity of faith and knowledge but also 
nurtured our maturity toward the "whole measure of the fullness 
of Christ." 
Although I never took a class from Robert Traina, he is my 
teacher. As a young seminarian in the early 1950s, I had a thirst 
to know the Word of God. Survey courses in Bible had given me 
a "skimming knowledge" of the Word. Critical courses in Bible 
had given me a "needle knowledge" of the Word. Both were 
needed and valuable. But then I enrolled for my first course in 
English Bible, a study of the Book of Judges. Methodical Bible 
Study, by Robert Traina, served as our textbook. The course 
awakened me to the Word in a way that I shall never forget. 
After I learned the principles of inductive Bible study and applied 
them to the study of the Book of Judges, the Spirit of God broke 
through my study with an insight that was at once creative, 
inspired and practical. My mind raced and my spirit leaped as 
never before in a learning situation. For the first time, I knew 
what the Apostle Paul meant when he described the "unity of 
faith and knowledge" as an outcome of teaching. Throughout the 
night, I found myself waking up with the anticipation of sharing a 
biblical insight with my professor and fellow students. Naively, 
but honestly, I was convinced that I had discovered a truth in the 
Word of God that no one had ever seen before. Then and there, 
inductive Bible study became a lifetime commitment. 
Years later, as president of Seattle Pacific University, I learned 
that Robert Traina and his wife Jane were graduates of the school. 
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In the search for our most distinguished alumni, their nam es 
surfaced as two people whose lives and ministries exemplified the 
ideals of the Christian university. The circles of their influence 
were far wider than might be expected. Dr. Traina, as a professor 
at The Biblical Seminary in New York and then Asbury 
Theological Seminary, stood at the very center of the movement to 
bring English Bible into the heart of the seminary curriculum. 
Although the classical tradition of theological education and the 
critical tradition of biblical study militated against this more 
practical intrusion, the values of English Bible were spelled out in 
the responses of students whose preaching and teaching were 
measurably enhanced. They did not hesitate to say so. When the 
time came to nominate the Alumnus of the Year for 1978 at 
Seattle Pacific University, Robert Traina was named and selected. 
Together with Jane and the family, we honored him in the 
U niversity Chapel, the annual homecoming event, an alumni 
dinner and a community reception. Not without significance, the 
event stands out as highlight of celebrating the new status of 
Seattle Pacific as a "University." 
When I accepted the presidency of Asbury Theological 
Seminary in 1982, the Trainas and McKennas were joined togeth er 
again as colleagues in a new dimension of preparing God's people 
for works of service. Early on, I remember pass ing his classroom 
door and seeing his meticulous and penetrating outline on the 
ever-present overhead screen. When I asked students about their 
learning, they invariably mentioned the insights of Dr. Traina's 
classes for preaching value and spiritual growth. When the 
opportunity came to establish a new professorial chair in the 
Seminary, I had the privilege of presiding at the installation of Dr. 
Traina as the Fred M. and Ada Thompson Professor of Biblical 
Studies. Most notable for the occasion , Pat Robertson, the 
television evangelist and presidential candidate, came to give the 
installment address for Dr. Traina. As one of his students at The 
Biblical Seminary in New York, Robertson spoke the witness, " Dr. 
Traina brought the Word of God to life for me." 
More recently, we have seen the consecration of Robert Traina 
to his calling. Periodic bouts of physical illness have sapped hi s 
strength. Yet, even if it has meant getting out of bed only for the 
hours of his classes, he has taught whenever it is humanl y 
possible. As a former dean of the Seminary, his preparation for 
teaching and his dedication to the classroom are exemplary for our 
faculty. 
Although Dr. Traina managed his own physical suffering, the 
dreaded cancer that took the life of his wife, Jane , caused him 
pain that seemed to know no limit. The brightness, bounce a nd 
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beauty which Jane exuded so naturally was taken from his life. 
Only his faith and family have sustained him during the time of 
grief. Outwardly, he has kept his composure, faithfully carried 
out his duties, and continued to minister to the others, but 
inwardly he weeps over his loss even while he cherishes the 
memories of life with Jane and claims the promise of eternal life. 
The "Jane Traina Bookstore" at the Seminary is a permanent 
memorial to her "counter ministry" with students, faculty, 
administration, book agents and visitors alike. 
Retirement is only another chapter in Dr. Traina's life history. 
His influence at the center of the English Bible movement will 
continue to spread in ever-widening circles wherever the gospel is 
preached. At the Seminary, his students who are now professors, 
Drs. David Thompson and David Bauer, are already rising in 
professorial, pastoral and scholarly stature to take his place. The 
revision of his Methodical Bible Study will continue to be a 
widely-used textbook that is timeless. Our Seminary curriculum 
gives required study in English Bible its rightful place among 
more classical courses. And, in the future, we envision the full 
endowment of the Professorial Chair of English Bible. 
Dr. Robert Traina, on behalf of the trustees, faculty and 
students of Asbury Theological Seminary, we thank God for you 
and celebrate your lasting ministry among us. 
DA YID L. MCKENNA 
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Intentions and the 
Logic of Interpretation 
WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM 
What exactly are we doing when we say that an author's inten-
tions should or should not have a role in the interpretation of a 
text? Are we making a claim about a crucial piece of evidence 
which should be taken into account, if at all poss ible? Or are we 
making a claim about grammar or logical character of the whole 
enterprise of interpretation? In this paper I shall mount a modest 
case for the latter way of construing this issue . I shall argue, that 
is, that the debate about intentions has been misplaced.I It has 
less to do with external avowals which an author may or may not 
make about the meaning of his work and much more to do with 
the fundamental goal of the interpretative process as a whole. We 
will begin by sketching more fully the first option and examining 
the case against appeal to intentions on that level. 
When an author's intentions in writing a particular text operate 
as a piece of external evidence, the logic of the situation is 
relatively straightforward. In puzzling over the meaning of a text, 
we normally assemble all sorts of evidence. We take into account 
the genre, the grammar, the style, the literary context, the usus 
loquendi of the words used, the circumstances in which the text 
was written, how it may have been or was received in its day, 
how it may have been composed and put together over time , and 
the like. Alongside these we now place the author's own account 
of what he was doing in writing the text under review. According 
to our hypothetical theory, the author's avowals will be treated as 
decisive in the construal of the text. These avowals may them-
selves be expressed in a variety of ways. They may be written in 
diaries or workbooks; or they may have been enshrined in a 
commentary on the relevant work; or they may have been made in 
some kind of public or private utterance which has been written 
William J. Abmham earned his M.Div. degree at Asbury Theological Seminary 
and his Ph.D. at Oxford University. He is McCrefess Associate Professor of 
Evangelism at Perkins Schoof of Theology, South em Methodist University. 
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down and has Of course, the author's intentions may 
have been enshrined in the text itself. One thinks immediately of 
what Luke has to say in his famous prologue or what John says in 
his tantalizing comments towards the end of his gospel. But this is 
so rarely true that we can overlook it for the moment. In any 
case, the appeal would be much the same: the author's avowals 
about his intentions would be treated as having a privileged 
position in the debate about the most appropriate rendering of the 
text. At the very least it would require very strong evidence to 
overturn what the author said he meant on any particular occasion. 
The appeal to intentions as evidence for a particular 
interpretation of a text has not, to my knowledge, been used to 
displace the appeal to other kinds of evidence. Othe r 
considerations are to be included in the process of interpretation; 
the issue is one of status, not exclusivism. Indeed, as applied to 
Holy Scripture the appeal to the intentions of the original author 
was embedded in a profound and hard-won attempt to tac kle 
questions about the meaning of a text in a rigorous and 
intellectually persuasive manner. On the one hand, it was part of 
a move to cut texts loose from dogmatic, theological traditions 
which refused to let them speak for themselves. In earlier times 
the enemy tended to be the classical creeds of the Church , while 
in more recent times the great enemy has been real and imagined 
forms of Fundamentalism. On the other hand, it was an attempt 
to rid scholarship of faulty methods of interpretation--like 
allegory, or hasty, pietistic application--which imposed meanings 
on the text which were clearly not there in the first place. 
Several interesting assumptions about texts and about human 
action are built into this deliberately sketchy account of 
interpretation. It is assumed, for example, that texts and authors 
are not just contingently, but logically, connected. A text is 
demarcated from mere markings on paper by its conceptual 
relation to human action. Texts are in fact human , intentional 
actions. They are the expression of human purposes and 
intentions; they are not mere events which occur as the result of 
natural, Jaw - like happenings in the world; they embody and ma ke 
manifest human consciousness. It is also assumed that, although 
texts are actions of human subjects acting to express certa in 
intentions and purposes, they are also objects in the world and as 
such they possess an independence which stands over against the 
would-be interpreter. However difficult it may be to decipher or 
read them, texts must be approached with great patience and skill 
so that their authors may be heard and understood. They should 
not be railroaded into saying something which their authors did 
not intend them to say. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
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author's intentions have a privileged position in the process of 
interpretation because the author has privileged access to his or 
her intentions. Generally speaking, the human subject knows his 
or her intentions better than an external observer does, or so it is 
widely held. It is this principle which surely operates as the 
warrant for the special place of authorial intention in the debate 
about interpretation. Finally, it is assumed in this account that we 
can draw a distinction between the meaning of a text and the 
significance of a text. The former remains stable; it is that which 
the author intended to convey in the text. To be sure, our 
account of what the author meant may have to change, for new 
evidence about authorial intention may come to light and hence 
lead to revisions in our interpretation. But that is one thing. It is 
another thing entirely to identify the significance of what a text 
says. Here we may speak of its truth or falsity, its depth or 
shallowness, its relevance or irrelevance, its beauty or plainness, 
and so on. These may change drastically, depending on the 
criteria of evaluation we deploy, on the circumstances in which 
we find ourselves and on the personal commitments of those 
making the evaluation. However we plot the distinction in detail, 
some distinction between meaning and significance will be pressed 
upon us by those who want to stress the crucial role of intentions 
in the act of interpretation. 
It is not entirely clear whether the attack on the role of 
intentions is meant to cut into all of the aforementioned 
assumptions. It may be simply an attack on the status of appeal to 
intentions when they are seen as part of wider battery of evidence 
which might be mustered by an interpreter. Or it may be 
something much more ontological and philosophical. It is 
absolutely crucial that we be clear about this, for there is far more 
to intentions than meets the eye initially.2 This is one of the 
enduring merits of attending to the claims of Derrida among the 
deconstructionists and Rorty among the new pragmatists.3 The 
latter are seeking to undermine in a very profound way the 
epistemological foundationalism which has been central to Western 
philosophy since Descartes. Their work in literary criticism 
generally, and their attack on intentionalism in particular, are part 
and parcel of a wider vision that covers issues which go far 
beyond those encompassed in traditional hermeneutics. An 
innovation of the magnitude they are seeking cannot hang on some 
kind of intentional fallacy, however generously construed; nor for 
that matter can it hinge on appeal to some expert in the field of 
literary criticism. Such an attack will depend on substantive 
philosophical moves in epistemology, and Rorty at least is only too 
aware of the demands that this lays upon both him and Derrida. 
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Indeed, what both Rorty and Derrida want to do is to overturn 
philosophy and epistemology, yet to do so they must deploy 
recognizably philosophical arguments, a feat which no one has as 
yet successfully performed. So we do well to isolate the debate 
about intentions initially as a debate about the status of certain 
kinds of evidence in the interpretation of a text. 
It is not difficult to find fault with the appeal to intentions in 
the interpretation of a text, and ever since Wimsatt and Beardsley 
published their famous article on the "intentional fallacy," many 
have followed their lead in banishing intentions from the process 
of interpretation proper.4 Their strictures about intention were 
initially limited to the interpretation of poetry, but as the debate 
proceeded they were extended to literature generally.s Of late, 
opposition to intentions has been spreading to biblical studies, 
most especially among those who are interested in the literary 
study of the Bible. It is surely not an exaggeration to say that a 
deep division has developed between those who operate 
fundamentally as historians and those who operate fundamentally 
as literary critics. Up ahead it is likely that the division will 
become sharper and deeper. 
The attack on intentions is mounted from a variety of angles. 
The most popular move at first is to point to the simple fact that 
in most cases, say, of the biblical literature, the author's intentions 
are not accessible. Like most simple points, this is expected to 
settle the issue immediately and its proponents hope to return in 
triumph to a closer reading of the text, trusting that they will be 
left alone to get on with their work. If this is all there is to the 
debate about intentions, then indeed the debate is over and we 
had best bury it for good. One could, of course, take the simple 
logical expedient of accepting the consequences of this state of 
affairs and arguing that this does not overthrow the place of 
intentions; it just shows that we are not in a position to interpret 
the relevant biblical material. Biblical scholars need not quit their 
jobs, but they must now earn a living performing other functions 
in the commonwealth of learning. That no one has seriously 
suggested this option should make us pause and ponder what is 
really at stake in the debate as a whole. Those opposed to 
intentions, however, are not going to be satisfied with this abrupt 
attempt to keep the commitment to intentions unharmed and 
intact. So the attack proceeds apace. 
Suppose we have access to the intentions of the author. For 
one thing, our author may have failed to execute her intentions in 
the work in question. Yet this does not render her text 
meaningless or necessarily obscure. Meaning therefore must be 
logically distinct form intentions. For another, the author may 
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have abandoned her original intentions in the course of her work 
or she may have included material which was not at all central in 
her deliberations. If the intentions have in any way changed, they 
can be of no help in determining the meaning of the work in 
hand. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the author best knows 
her intentions. We can all be deceived or ill-informed about our 
intentions. In some cases it even appears that the author had no 
idea what she was up to until the work was finished and she 
turned and read the work for herself, just like any other 
intelligent reader. Privileged access, even if it does exist, does not 
in the least guarantee infallibility; yet only infallibility could 
underwrite the claim that avowals about intentions have a special 
status. Add to this the fact that a text often has a surplus of 
meaning over and above what the author intended. Our author 
may not know the full meaning of what she is saying, or she may 
be incompetent or not inclined to declare what she meant. Surely 
something along these lines lies behind the commonplace among 
Protestants that God has still more light to break from His Word. 
The original author may have only been incipiently aware of what 
she was saying; to limit oneself to intentional meaning is therefore 
restrictive and spiritually debilitating. Texts are far richer than 
the standard intentionalist can allow. 
Furthermore, persons who talk about the intentions of an 
author tend to be general and schematic, so it is not clear how 
precisely they will illuminate this or that part of the text. An 
author's intention to write a satire or a tragedy does not tell the 
reader how to handle the details of the script. Indeed there are 
cases where knowledge of the author's intentions tells us next to 
nothing about the text. Thus, to know that someone wrote a play 
to make a lot of money or to placate an enemy will not get us 
very far in the process of interpretation. Nor can the appeal to 
intentions set any ultimate guard against subjectivity, as Hirsch 
and his admirers so fondly hope, for intentions are by definition 
inward mental acts which are not available for inspection by the 
general public. It is surely better by far to work with the text in 
hand and let its precise and particular features settle whatever 
disputes arise. Textual certainties may not amount to much when 
weighed in the scales of knowledge, but they are all we have and 
they are always to be pref erred to biographical speculations which 
take us away from the text and into the swamps of endless 
background studies and genetic guesswork. 
Finally, there are extra considerations which come into play 
when we deal with a canonical text of Scripture. Text embodied 
in a sacred canon takes on new meaning when read as part of the 
canonical whole. As the biblical writers had no idea that their 
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work would have canonical status, there is no way in which they 
could have intended the meaning that their work now has, given 
its place in Holy Scripture. Attempts to get around this by 
claiming that the intentions of the final editors or canonizers , or 
even God, are to be the bearers of the relevant intentions is just 
one last-ditch effort to save the appeal to intentions. There is 
absolutely no warrant in the texts themselves for such a move; 
only a dogged commitment to theory precipitates such desperate 
expedients. 
The consequences of this attack on intentions are extremely 
significant for hermeneutics. By far the most interesting for our 
purposes is that it calls into question the whole quest to ferret out 
the inner life behind the outer text associated with 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Collingwood. Thus, if this attempt to 
reject intentions succeeds, it will make no sense to speak of the 
interpreter reversing the causal process which brought the text 
into existence or of seeking to relive the thoughts which lie 
behind the text. Exercises of this character will be seen as adding 
nothing to the task of interpretation properly conceived; on the 
contrary, they may well be construed as a devious distraction. To 
be sure, such operations may be of some psychological value in 
drawing attention to evidence within the text which might 
otherwise go unnoticed, but they are of no deep epistemic value 
and they are assuredly not the heart of the interpretive enterprise . 
Those opposed to intentionalism of one sort or another are not 
agreed on exactly what the heart of the enterprise should be . 
Some, especially those impressed by Marx, have turned to the 
social context of a text, as the key to interpretation. How far this 
alternative can avoid an unacceptable form of determinism and 
reductionism cannot be pursued here, but there is no denying that 
placing texts in their wider social setting can be exceptionally 
illuminating and the wise interpreter will develop a keen eye for 
the possibilities which this option may make available. Others, 
especially those interested in the formal f ea tu res and structures of 
language, have turned to a close reading of the text as an 
autonomous object as the hope for the future. The text itself is 
read and reread until it yields up its riches. Again, there is no 
denying the fascinating and penetrating observations which have 
emerged from such endeavour. Others have sought for their 
literary salvation in the mining of continental, hermeneutical 
philosophy and the theories of meaning developed in this fertile 
domain. As some ponder the options, they sometimes gain the 
impression that the task of interpretation has become a thoroughly 
relativistic operation where subjectivism reigns and where there 
are no controls to adjudicate between one interpretation and 
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another. 1 suspect that this reaction reflects panic rather than 
good judgment, but, where sentiments like this prevail, it is small 
wonder that the commitment to intentions as a crucial issue in 
hermeneutics dies very hard indeed. 
If intentions are to be seen as crucial, however, it should not 
be because appeal to intentions is the only way to head off 
relativism or subjectivism. Taking this line, aside from tending to 
beg vital questions against rival visions of interpretation , is likely 
to breed fantasy and confusion in our hermeneutics . If intentions 
are important, it is not just because we want them to be important 
or because we fail to be attracted by anti-intentionalist or non-
intentionalist accounts of interpretation. They should be taken 
seriously because reference to them is logically indispensable in 
any plausible account of interpretation. In recent analytical 
philosophy precisely such an account has emerged over the last 
generation. The account in question began !if e as an attempt to 
solve certain problems in the philosophy of language and was then 
applied to the debate about interpretation. 
Even though the primary work on this issue is highly 
technical, the relevant data for the task of interpretation can be 
stated quite succinctly. The key point to grasp is that the meaning 
of an utterance is not just a matter of the discourse deployed or 
the sentences uttered; it is fundamentally a matter of the speech 
act performed by the speaker on specific occasions in particular 
contexts. Moreover, the speech act performed is in turn 
determined by the intentions of the relevant speaker. Hence the 
interpretation of an utterance, and by extension the interpretation 
of a text, is logically related to the action performed by the person 
or persons who made the utterance or produced the text, and the 
action can only be identified by referring to the intention which 
governs it. 
The standard way to deal with the issue at stake here is to 
attend to what J. L. Austin referred to as the illocutionary force 
of an utterance.6 Thus when someone in normal circumstances 
seriously utters the sentence, "Shut the door," there are three 
distinct elements to be noted. There is the locution itself or the 
locutionary act; the speaker has said this particular sentence. 
There is, secondly, the act performed in what has been said; in 
this case an order has been given. Finally, there is a 
perlocutionary element in that this particular act may have had 
certain effects on its hearer; say, it may have made the hearer feel 
sad. According to Austin and those who have borrowed or built 
on his work, understanding the illocutionary force of an utterance 
is essential to understanding the meaning of an utterance, hence it 
is quite inadequate simply to attend to the public meaning of the 
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sentence uttered . Thus, to take a hackneyed example, if someone 
were to say, "There is thin ice over there," it is essential not only 
to know what the various parts of this sentence mean in English 
but also to know how the speaker is using the sentence. Normally 
we take it as an affirmation, but in various circumstances this 
sentence could be an order, a warning, an insult or a request. To 
know this we need to know the intentions of the speaker in using 
this particular utterance. Discarding any reference to intentions 
and attending closely merely to the locutionary act in question will 
e liminate , therefore, an essential ingred ient in the meaning and 
hence in the understanding of the utterance. What applies to this 
short, pithy utterance also applies to whole stretches of utte rance 
such as we find in written texts. 
Needless to say, various aspects of this proposal have co me 
unde r attack in the philosophy of language .7 Enough of it remains 
intact , however , to cut deeply into the d ebate about intentions. 
What is especially important is the general orientation which it 
gives to the interpretive process. Even if the case has not been 
fully made for intentions as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the identification of illocutionary force, it sets texts 
very firmly in the domain of human actions . So Dilthey and his 
admirers were correct to develop a general hermeneutic which 
would focus on the understanding of human actions generally as 
the key to understanding texts. A text is not so me abstract entity 
floating in free space endowed with meaning by some mystical 
agent called language or discourse. Nor are texts natural objects 
produced by passive, unintentional agents. Whatever else they are, 
texts are fundamentally the fru it of human action and are 
generally created to express human intentions and purposes. 
Speakers produce meaning, not texts per se; in this process they 
make use of discourse, and to reverse this order and focus 
primarily on language and secondarily on what is actually achieved 
by use of language is to get the cart before the horse. As 
Strawson puts it succinctly, " as theorists, we know nothing of 
human language unless we understand human speech." 8 
Hence , when interpreters debate the role of intentions in their 
work it is hope lessly inadequate to resolve this issue simply by 
insisting that we may not have access to the avowals of the author 
as to what he or she meant. To work on this level is to work 
bereft of crucial conceptual tools and thus prevent the relevant 
issues being canvassed appropriately from the outset of the 
discussion. Besides, making an avowal about our intention is only 
one way of getting access to our intention, and we may be more 
or less fallible in our claims in this domain. The text itself will 
be a vital part of the evidence as to what intentions are expressed 
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in the work, and it is the task of the interpreter to develop skill in 
picking up what they are and hence determining what the force of 
the utterance under review may be. Nor will it do to confuse 
intentions with logically distinct matters such as motives, desires, 
feelings and other mental acts and events.9 To do so is to make 
elementary blunders in the philosophy of mind and breed 
unnecessary confusion in the field of hermeneutics. 
Yet we must be careful in all our claims about both human 
actions and intentions . The terrain here is extraordinarily slippery 
and it is easy to fall prey to simplistic theories of action. 
Contrary to the standard orthodoxy on the subject, I seriously 
doubt if a general theory of human action is in fact intellectually 
attainable. This is not to decry the attempt to tie actions to 
intentions conceptually, but I am not fully convinced that all that 
human agents do as responsible agents is done intentionally. It is 
certainly useful to begin with a firm connection between actions 
and intentions, but this is the first word; it is unlikely to be the 
last. Thus I may set out to do x and end up doing y without at all 
realizing what I was doing or intending to do what I did. For 
example, contemporary television evangelists insist that they are 
simply using modern media to spread the old-time gospel, while in 
actual fact many of them are offering a new gospel message and 
their actions are more akin to that of an entertainer than that of 
an evangelist. That they would vehemently reject such a 
description of their action is beside the point. They are simply 
unaware of the social character of their behavior and how it may 
be legitimately understood. If this example seems too 
controversial, consider the situation where I set out to shoot 
Murphy in the Enniskillen stockyard filled with cattle. I fire and 
miss, but my action of shooting scares the cattle and they 
stampede, trampling Murphy to death. Here I have the intention 
to kill Murphy and I kiII him, congratulating myself all the way to 
prison for what I have done; but I do not kill him intentionally . I 
suspect that examples like these may crop up quite frequently in 
our work on human texts, and anti-intentionalists are correct to 
focus on how tricky intentions really are. However, they tend to 
misread the significance of their astute observations by failing to 
see this as a signal to look afresh at the whole notion of action 
rather than as an invitation to focus on texts in themselves. We 
need to pursue the complexity of human speech- acts rather than 
just look again at the language and text. This is what I meant at 
the outset of this paper when I suggested that the debate about 
intentions was misplaced; it is less a matter of the relevance of 
certain kinds of evidence than it is about the total orientation of 
our work in hermeneutics. It is crucial in this orientation to place 
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texts where they belong; in the stream of human life, thought and 
action. 
We might summarize the fundamental thesis we are driving 
towards in this way: Hermeneutics is not so much the study of 
what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. 
If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention 
and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less 
than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and 
charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and 
achievement may coincide more often that not. In any case, the 
old proverb holds; actions speak louder than words; so it is the 
actions which should get our full attention. Moreover, in 
understanding actions we do well to adopt the lofty vision outlined 
by Dilthey: " The ultimate goal of the hermeneutic process is to 
understand an author better than he understood himse lf." 10 This 
is clearly the case with many human actions, and thus we do well 
to set ourselves this task in hermeneutics. In the light of this, the 
task of the interpreter is to summon all the relevant evidence and 
all the ski ll that can be mustered to elucidate the nature of the 
achievement in question . For the author, the road to mea ning is 
paved by good achievements, and the versatile and wily 
interpreter will map out such achievements as lucidly as possible. 
In constructing such maps, it will be useful to bear the following 
general rubrics in mind (all of which stem from construing a text 
as an achievement or an action and all of which have been 
vigorously advocated at one time or another in the history of 
hermeneutics). 
First, it is useful to keep a distinction between the elucidation 
of a text and the evaluation of a text. As with the evaluation of 
actions generally, it is morally required that we know what a 
person has done in some detail before we evaluate the worth of 
what has been done. This holds for the study of action in the 
writing of texts. In the evaluation of a text, it is important a t 
times to bear in mind the intended aim of the author. For 
example, if a writer intended to write a satire or an apocalypse, it 
is clearly erroneous to evaluate such work as if it were a piece of 
sober historical narrative . Intention in itself does not determine, 
in some simplistic fashion, precisely what value we should attach 
to a particular work, but it should be taken into account in the 
evaluative process overall. We may even need to take into account 
the motives of an author as we evaluate a text. Thus, if we know 
that a writer's motive was to smear the good name of an 
opponent, then this will have an obvious bearing on our val ue of 
the worth of the text. The process of evaluation as a whole will 
involve a variety of criteria, depending on our commitments and 
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the express point of our evaluations. The good interpreter will 
develop a high degree of self knowledge in this area without 
sacrificing nimbleness of touch and economy of operation. 
Second, in elucidating a text, it will be crucial to attend to the 
linguistic repertoire of an author. The study of grammar, syntax, 
vocabulary, genre, style, local idioms, usage, and the like, are 
indispensable. In this there is no substitute for the demanding 
task of mastering the original languages. The loss of these in the 
modern seminary is surely to be deeply regretted. Also crucial is 
a knowledge of how to read a book as a whole, dismantle it and 
then put it back together again . Here concessions to the natural 
language of the reader can legitimately be made, and it is crucial 
to bear in mind the communicative conventions Traina has 
captured in his analysis of the relationships to be found with a 
text. 11 We need also to bear in mind the innovations and 
transformations which an author may have introduced. In all, we 
need to know the capacities and range of options available to an 
author in producing a text. If we neglect this, we are liable to 
underestimate or overestimate what has been , or fail to perceive 
what action has actually been performed. 
Third, we need to develop a keen eye for the historical context 
and particular circumstances in which a text has been written. At 
this point, the current wrangle between historians and literary 
critics is of deep significance. It is certainly true that historians 
have not always served us as well as they might. As far as the 
interpretation of Scripture is concerned, they have at times 
dismantled the texts into atomistic bits and pieces, they have lost 
the text in a mass of genetic and background information, they 
have indulged in fanciful speculation which is intellectually 
unedifying, they have set unduly restrictive limits on the options 
open to the contemporary theologian, and they have arrogantly set 
aside exegetical insights from the astonishingly rich heritage of 
interpretation which is available to us. Whatever catalogue of sins 
we cobble together, we cannot ignore history if we construe the 
interpretation of a text as the interpretation of a human 
achievement. Achievements take place in a context and in a set of 
circumstances. To understand them is to see them as making sense 
within the conventions, assumptions, values, beliefs and attitudes 
of their situation. Hence our knowledge of an author's repertoire 
of linguistic action depends on historical information about the 
period and the circumstances of the actual writing. Those who 
focus on a close reading of the text as an autonomous object 
either ignore this at their peril or smuggle precisely such 
information into the interpretive process without acknowledgment. 
There is another reason why history is important. Some texts 
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cannot be understood at all adequately if we do not know 
something about the ideas and the events concerning which they 
speak. If we read a text ahistorically in such circumstances we are 
liable to go astray. Equally, if a writer is making a rejoinder to 
another text, it is important that we have access to such 
information. Thus, if an interpreter insists that Job is a response 
to Deuteronomy, or that James is a response to Paul, we need the 
aid of the historian in evaluating such claims. How we resolve 
these issues will have a clear bearing on the illocutionary force of 
much of what is said. We cannot say in advance when or how 
historical information will be relevant. Some texts are more 
heteronomous than others, but even in seemingly autonomous 
books like Proverbs it is exceptionally illuminating to have some 
idea of the proverbial repertoire available at the time of writing, 
the traditions out of which the book emerges, and the way in 
which the current text of Proverbs may represent or depart from 
these conventions. Of course our judgments in history are 
invariably contested , and it is easy to be carried away by those 
alternatives which chime with our prepossessions. The sensitive 
interpreter will soon learn to make a virtue of such necessities 
while taking with radical seriousness the canons of historical 
judgment. 
It is in this context that we should deal with the place of a 
text within the canon of Scripture as a whole . Two points deserve 
mention. First, it is both important and useful to see what 
happens to our understanding of a text when it has been placed in 
a sacred canon by a community of faith . It is best to designate 
our intellectual undertakings at this level not as the elucidation of 
the text but as the careful integration of the content of a variety 
of texts in a wider theological vision. When we appropriate the 
significance of a text of Scripture and relate it intimately to our 
expanding metaphysical commitments, how we do so will depend 
in part on how we relate that text to our understanding of other 
relevant, scriptural texts. Significance, in turn , will depend on 
elucidation in the sense that we cannot satisfactorily gauge the 
value of a text without first knowing what the text means. He nce 
we need to tread warily when claims are made about the canonical 
meaning of a text. Perhaps we should speak of canonical 
significance rather than canonical meaning . 
Second, when we deal with the text as part of the canon of 
Scripture much more attention needs to be given to the broader 
historical considerations which are at stake. The process of 
canonization was part of a wider enterprise which the early church 
initiated in order to deal with its life and teachings in the crises 
which it faced over several centuries. Thus to cope with its 
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problems, the church not only put together a canon of Scripture, it 
also developed various creeds and put episcopacy in place. On an 
intellectual level, there is a deep sense in which creed and 
Scripture go together canonically, while episcopacy can be read as 
an attempt to secure these canons as integral to the social authority 
of the church and as constitutive of its identity. Much harm has 
been done in Protestantism when this is neglected. Scripture has 
been called upon to perform functions which were designed to be 
met by the creeds, and the creeds have been ignored or neglected 
in the canonical construal of Scripture. A canonical reading of 
Scripture which fails to take into account the early creeds of the 
church is therefore historically inept, and this is one more reason 
for treating the canonical interpretation of Scripture at the level of 
significance and appropriation rather than at the level of 
elucidation and exegesis. 
In conclusion, one further point springs naturally to mind in 
our brief comments on the rubrics of interpretation. When we 
deal with a text, we cannot ignore the subject or particular 
content in which the writer is engaged. To take a simple example, 
adequate elucidation of a classical philosophical text depends in 
part on one's capacity to understand philosophical ideas and issues. 
The good interpreter will be able to draw on insights which have 
been furnished by wrestling with the questions the text addresses 
and with rival ways of construing and resolving them. Initially, 
one's capacity in this field may well develop by means of 
extensive interaction and dialogue with the text in hand . More 
appropriately, we might say that our reading of a text is like a 
dialogue with an author or speaker whose action continues across 
space and time into the present to inform and develop our 
judgments and latent human capacities. 
This is clearly the case with Scripture. Deep and profound 
elucidations of the text depend on spiritual insight and on 
theological sensitivity as well as on standard linguistic, literary and 
historical skill. This is as it should be if the interpretation of a 
text is the interpretation of a human achievement, for this is 
inevitably set in the stream of human life, thought and action. 
Out of the richness of their experience, the depths of their 
theological acumen, the storehouse of their ability to communicate 
their proposals, the great interpreters take the reader into a new 
world of wonder and challenge where fresh horizons are 
encountered and prevailing capacities are developed. It is 
impossible to capture what is at stake here in a set of formal rules 
or in conceptual analysis of the underlying assumptions and 
principles. These have their place, but they are no substitute for 
direct exposure to those who have already mastered this art and 
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can share it with others. In this respect it is difficult to surpass 
what Robert Traina instantiates for those fortunate enough to have 
been his students. · 
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Mediated Meaning: 
A Contextualist Approach to 
Hermeneutical Method 
JERRYH. GILL 
Traditionally defined as "the science of interpretation," 
hermeneutics has of late evolved into a full-fledged philosophical 
concern of its own. Flowing out of the two opposing branches of 
the early twentieth century's " search for meaning" (analytic and 
existentialist philosophy), hermeneutics stands today as the central 
intersection of dialogue within and among such diverse disciplines 
as philosophy, linguistics, the arts, political theory, psychology and 
theology. The issues and points of view are many and diverse.' 
My purpose here is to sketch, in broad strokes, the main contours 
of the landscape and to provide a suggested perspective or 
"inscape" of my own. 
The modern era of hermeneutical understanding was ushered 
in with the introduction of the historical-critical method of 
textual interpretation.2 In a much needed and eventually 
successful attempt to counteract the tyrannical dominance of 
authoritarian and/ or spiritualizing hermeneutical activity, modern 
scholarship turned to objective, scientific criteria and procedures 
for determining what a given text meant . I stress the past tense of 
the term "meant" advisedly, for the emphasis of the historical-
critical approach has consistently been on ascertaining what the 
text meant for the writer and those to whom it was originally 
addressed. By means of historical and textual research , including 
and especially archeological investigation, modern interpreters 
have sought to bridge the gap between the time of the text and 
their own, thereby facilitating a contemporary understanding of 
the text's meaning. Norman Perrin offers a fair account of this 
historical-critical method in the following passage: 
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In the case of texts from another time and another culture 
this can be an extremely complex and difficult task , 
involving many different considerations, but the theoretical 
principles involved are both firmly established and well 
understood. We need, further, to understand as far as we 
can the intent of the author in writing the text, and the 
meaning understood by those for whom the text was 
written. For all of this we need a number of different 
critical skills, and ultimately a measure of historical 
imagination, as we seek to understand the text as the 
author intended it to be understood, or as it was 
understood by those who first read it.3 
Over against what they perceived as the dehumanizing effects 
of the "cult of objectivity" existentialist thinkers arose, ad vocating 
a more personal, subjective approach to hermeneutics. 4 Not only 
is there no way to know the original meaning of a given text , 
since, as Kierkegaard demonstrated, "significant" meaning always 
transcends mere probability and observation, there is no need to 
know it, since what really matters for us is what the text means 
for today, here and now. In spite of their antipathy for each 
other, those advocating the historical-critical method and those 
touting the existentialist posture are agreed that there is a meaning 
to be found in the text, a message or lesson which can be 
discerned, either after appropriate scientific investigation , in the 
former case, or after proper demythologization, in the latter case. 
Bultmann is as clear as he is adamant that the meaning of 
biblical texts, for instance, must and can lie only in the fresh 
"self-understanding" which it brings to each of us. As he puts it: 
The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective 
picture of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth 
should be interpreted not cosmologically, but 
anthropologically, or better still, existentially. Myth speaks 
of the power or the powers which man supposes he 
experiences as the ground and limit of his world and of his 
own activity and suffering. He describes these powers in 
terms derived from the visible world, with its tangible 
objects and forces, and from human life, with its feelings, 
motives, and potentialities ... Hence the importance of the 
New Testament mythology lies not in his imagery, but in 
the understanding of existence which it enshrines.5 
Following along in the subjectivist mode, and drawin g as well 
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on the advice of the "new critics" to avoid the fallacy of assuming 
anyone can determine the writer's original intentions, the robust 
deconstructionists burst on the scene.6 This hermeneutical posture 
or non- posture maintains that the meaning of any text is what we 
make it , because not only are we unable to reconstruct its original 
meaning , either for the author or the readers, but language itself 
is incorrigibly vague, ambiguous and contradictory. The meaning 
of a text can never be ascertained and/ or interpreted, either for 
those then or for us now, for the simple reason that language will 
not stand still long enough to allow a single meaning--and this 
fact ought to be celebrated, rather than lamented! Any given 
statement can be given a number of meanings, sometimes even the 
opposite of what it appears to mean, as ironic utterances clearly 
illustrate. One of the more enthusiastic proponents of the 
application of this methodology to the theological enterprise is 
Mark Taylor. In personal conversation he said to me that it is 
"the most important thing to happen to theology in the latter half 
of the twentieth century." 
It is significant to note that the deconstructionist 
hermeneutical posture, while sharing the subjectivist emphasis of 
the existentialist approach, differs both from it and from the 
objectivism of the historical-critical perspective by insisting that 
meaning is never direct, but is, rathe r, entirely a function of the 
hearer's interpretive response. In other words, according to 
deconstructionist thinkers, the focus of meaning has shifted from 
the author, to the text itself, and finally to the reade r alone . In 
short, the activity of interpretation, as well as the meaning of a 
given text, has now become so indirect, the focus has become so 
"soft," as to be essentially nonexistent. Meaning is in the mind of 
the reader or hearer, period. 
It is, of course, impossible to deny both the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of these hermeneutical postures. The trick is 
to devise some way of integrating the former and avoiding the 
latter without ending up with a lumpy eclecticism. Is there a way 
to maintain the objectivity and authority of the text, together with 
contemporary and personal relevance, and yet acknowledge the 
indirect , open- texture of language? By itself the historical-critical 
method is limited , both in results and scope of application. 
Existentialist hermeneutics tends to be not only a-historical but 
anti-historical and social. Deconstructionism makes a valuable 
point, but becomes pointless--and indeed, meaningless--when 
applied to itself. So, one must ask, in Peggy Lee's words, "Is that 
all there is?" 
My own suggestion at this juncture is to urge the development 
of a contextua/ist approach to hermeneutics, one which 
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incorporates the emphases and concerns at each of the above 
postures. More specifically, a contextualist hermeneutic seeks an 
understanding of a text in which meaning is mediated in and 
through the historical, existential and linguistic dimensions of 
human experience simultaneously. There simply is no need to 
choose any of these aspects of our common life as the primary 
mode, or to assume that they are mutually exclusive . For, clearly, 
our day-to-day existence does not come compartmentalized in 
such a manner. The following diagram indicates the relationship 
amongst these various emphases and methodologies: 
Existentialist 
Method 
Subjectivity Deconstructionist 
Method 
direct 
specific 
Historical-Critical 
Method 
indirect 
open-texture 
Objectivity 
.._ Cognitive 
Contextualist 
Method 
As I see it, contextualist hermeneutic is comprised of at least 
three main themes, each of which deserves a brief explication. 
The following remarks constitute my own "inscape" (with thanks 
to Gerard Manley Hopkins) into the hermeneutical thicket 
sketched above. 
II 
First, a contextualized perspective acknowledges the deeply 
social and relational character of language and speech. People 
speak, not only in order to be understood, but because they are 
understood. It is language which mediates social reality to us, 
both initially and continuously, and which brings us into the 
human community, both as members and as selves . Thus the 
hermeneutical task is surely grounded in a basic knowledge of 
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what a given text meant in its original human context, both 
historically and linguistically. This historical-critical concern is 
complemented, rather than set aside, by an equally sincere concern 
for the meaning of a text in the contemporary setting. Moreover, 
neither of these dimensions is obviated by a sensitivity to the 
flexible, open-textured quality of language, a quality which is 
necessitated by the ever-evolving social tasks in which language is 
employed. 
One thinker who has contributed a great deal to this 
contextualist perspective is the social psychologist George Herbert 
Mead.7 Mead stressed the social character of the human self, and 
the crucial role played by language in the composition of both 
culture and personhood. He termed the process by means of 
which both are constituted, " symbolic interaction," and he argued 
cogently for the "thick" understanding of the integral relationship 
between language and reality which comprises the fabric of human 
existence. Language is more than a mere system of signs for 
designating parts and aspects of the world . It is, rather, an 
organic form of human behavior that creates and shapes our world 
as well as describing it. Here is how he states it: 
The central factor in such adjustment is "meaning." 
Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation 
between the gesture of a given human organism and the 
subsequent behavior of this organism as indicated to 
another human organism by that gesture. If that gesture 
does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or 
resultant) behavior of the given organism, then it has 
meaning. In other words, the relationship between a given 
stimulus--as a gesture--and the later phases of the social 
act for which it is an early (if not the initial) phase 
constitutes the field within which meaning originates and 
exists. Meaning is thus a development of something 
objectively there as a relation between certain phases of 
the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and 
it is not an "idea" as traditionally conceived .... The social 
process, as involving communication, is in a sense 
responsible for the appearance of new objects in the field 
of experience of the individual organisms implicated in 
that process. Organic processes or responses in a sense 
constitute the objects to which they are responses; that is 
to say, any given biological organism is in a way 
responsible for the existence (the meanings they have for 
it) of the objects to which it physiologically and chemically 
responds. There would, for example, be no food--no 
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edible objects--if there were no organisms which could 
digest it. And similarly, the social process in a sense 
constitutes the objects to which it responds or to which it 
is an adjustment. That is to say, objects are constituted in 
terms of meanings within the social process of experience 
and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one 
another of the responses or actions of the various 
individual organisms involved in that process, an 
adjustment made possible by means of a communication 
which takes the form of a conversation gestures in the 
earlier evolutionary stages of that process and of language 
in its later stages. s 
Another contributor to the contextualist approach is the 
mature Ludwig Wittgenstein.9 He emphasized the social and active 
dimension of speech by likening it to the various "games people 
play." He did not intend thereby to trivialize or demean linguistic 
interchange. Rather, he sought to highlight its pragmatic nature, 
that it is grounded in our shared tasks and purposes, and thus that 
it is a way we do things in and with our common world. 
Wittgenstein likened speech to a toolbox, to chess and to the 
exchange of money in order to suggest that meaning is, at the 
deepest level, a function of use in context. After all , apart from 
some concrete use in a particular setting by and to a specific 
person(s), a given string of sounds and/ or markings cannot be said 
to have any meaning at all. The following is a representati ve 
Wittgenstienian insight: 
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and yo u 
think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the 
word , though also different from the word. Here the 
word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that 
you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its 
use .) ... A main source of our failure to understand is that 
we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. 
Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A 
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding 
which consists in "seeing connexions" .... 10 
Hans-George Gadameru has also contributed to a contextualist 
understanding of hermeneutics by means of his explorations in the 
phenomenology of language. Like Wittengenstein , Gadamer 
focuses on the participatory and interactionary aspects of linguistic 
communication, particularly through the notions of "play" and 
"conversation." These notions underline both the creative and 
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dialogical character of speech, indeed, even to the point of 
stressing the significance of silence in an overall understanding of 
meaning. For Gadamer, language is organic; it grows and dies. In 
addition, language is neither optional nor arbitrary; all humans 
participate in it to some degree and, at the primordial level, it 
arises in the warp and weft of concrete daily existence. As he 
says: 
Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. 
For it is in the nature of the tool that we master its use, 
which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it 
has done its service . That is not the same as when we take 
the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and 
with their use let them sink back into the general store of 
words over which we dispose. Such an analogy is false 
because we never find ourselves as consciousness over 
against the world and , as it were grasp after a tool of 
understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our 
knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, 
we are always already encompassed by the language that is 
our own. We grow up, and we become acquainted with 
men and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn 
to speak. Learning to speak does not mean learning to use 
a preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow 
familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and 
acquaintance with the world itself and how it confronts 
us.12 
III 
A second motif of a contextualist hermeneutic is an insistence 
on the active and pragmatic character of linguistic communication. 
Here again, the later Wittgenstein's work has proven to be most 
helpful, for it gave rise to the insights of the Oxford philosopher , 
J. L. Austin.n Austin began by noting that frequently we do 
more than merely speak when we use language, we sometimes 
accomplish deeds as well. When, for example, we say "I 
apologize," or "I pronounce you husband and wife" in the 
appropriate circumstances, etc., we are performing the act of 
apologizing and pronouncing. Austin dubbed such utterances 
"performatives," and he suggested that as an important form of 
speech they break down the traditional dichotomies between 
language and reality, and between factual judgments and value 
judgments. In his later work, Austin suggested that every 
"speech-act" consists of at least three dimensions of meaning, 
each of which is essential to its overall significance. 
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Take, for example, the sign which used to hang in British 
railway lavatories: "Gentlemen Lift the Seat." One might well ask 
whether this is a stipulative definition, an empirical description, 
an imperative or an invitation to upperclass larceny. Everything 
depends on context and use, and in spite of the fact that it is both 
enlightening and entertaining to play around with possible 
meanings, it is roughly clear what this sign means. However, 
Austin would surely suggest that there is a "referential" dimension 
to the utterance (there must be gentlemen and a seat, for instance) , 
as well as an "intentional" dimension (what the sign-makers 
intended) and a "responsive" dimension (some signs are so 
constructed as to give rise to unintended responses). All of these 
aspects of meaning must be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the sign. 
It is this pragmatic thrust of language which counteracts the 
unbridled relativism of deconstructionism. For, although any 
given statement is subject to a wide variety of readings , in the 
vast majority of cases the context either provides sufficient 
guidance by which to ascertain the meaning, or sufficient 
feedback by which to determine what went wrong in the case of 
misunderstanding. To acknowledge the possibility of multiple 
meanings and misunderstandings is a far cry from affirming that 
concrete interpretation is impossible. As Wittgenstein put it: " If I 
say 'The ground was quite covered with plants,' do you want to 
say that you don't know what I mean until I give you a definition 
of a 'plant'?" Of course, many readings are possible, even here , 
but that does not mean that some are not better than others. 14 
Another thinker, once again a phenomenologist, who f eeds 
into the pragmatist current of a contextualist approach to 
hermeneutics is Maurice Merleau-Ponty.15 His work on the 
pivotal role of human embodiment in the composition of our 
particular form of !if e, especially as it involves the use of speech 
as a form of bodily behavior, is of front-rank significance. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that through embodiment and language we 
interact with and shape our world, both physical and social. In 
short, he contends that our world is in large measure linguistically 
constituted by means of our interaction with each other in our 
common environment for specific shared tasks. We can neither 
separate our "inner" selves from our interactional relationships 
with the world, nor can we grasp reality and/ or its meaning 
directly, apart from these relationships. However, reflection can 
"set back ... to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks 
from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to 
the world and thus brings them to notice."16 
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IV 
Third, a contextualist stance toward hermeneutical activity 
recognizes that, at the primordial level, language and meaning are 
fundamentally metaphoric in nature. The work of Owen Barfield 
is highly significant here.17 He calls attention to a deep 
contradiction which underlies our modern view of language. On 
the one hand , we are generally committed to the idea that people 
in ancient and classical (not to say "primitive") times imbibed 
myth and metaphor, while we in modern times have " put away 
such childish things" in favor of more precise, scientific speech. 
On the other hand, we are equally committed to a theory of 
language which entails that it begins with specific, literal 
meanings and only later are metaphoric and symbolic meanings 
derived. But both cannot be true. It cannot be the case that 
metaphors build on literal meanings and that the vast majority of 
literal terms are in fact "dead" metaphors! 
Barfie ld argues that at its inception, whether with respect to 
the species or the individual, language must be endemically poetic 
in the sense that it does not stand over against or represent reality, 
but rather functions symbiotically with it in the mutual 
composition of our experienced and known world. Primordial 
speech unites thought and reality, analytic speech divides them. 
Both, of course, are necessary to human life, but it is clear that 
the unity must exist, as a Gestalt, be/ ore analysis can take place. 
Thus both the historical-critical method and deconstructionism 
must acknowledge a more fundamental level of meaning that 
provides the context or the foothold for their own activity to have 
meaning. We can only analyze, we can only deconstruct, what we 
have understood as meaningful in the first place. 
One of the most controversial books in philosophical circles in 
recent years has been Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. is Kuhn's insights into the development of scientific 
thought lend support to the case for a contextualist hermeneutic. 
In brief, he contends that in order for any scientific activity to be 
carried out there must exist some theoretic framework, some 
unarticulated assumptions, forming what Kuhn calls the dominant 
paradigm, according to which this activity, including the theoretic 
level, gets its direction and meaning. He also maintains that at 
certain crucial junctures in the history of science, these paradigms 
shift, causing a revolution in the way scientists think and work. 
The Copernican and Einsteinian revolutions are examples of such 
shifts in paradigms. 
What is pivotal for our topic is the idea, espoused by an 
increasing number of scientific thinkers, that all meaningful 
activity and thought must take place within some social and 
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linguistic context. Contrary to the warnings of some, this does not 
mean that all truth and meaning are relative in the subjectivist, 
skeptical sense. Rather, it simply means that serious attention 
must be paid to the shape and direction, to the concrete 
particulars, of the context within which linguistic meaning arises 
when one engages in the task of interpretation. From the fact that 
no meaning is contextless it does not follow that meaningful 
communication is impossible. 
There are many points of connection between the notion of 
paradigm and that of metaphor in the primordial sense. It is 
within what Stephen Pepper called our "root metaphors" l9 that we 
live and move and have our being, at both the practical and 
theoretic levels of our common human existence. One could argue 
that the history of any culture, especially in relation to 
intercultural encounter and dialogue, exhibits shifts in root 
metaphors, or mythologies, parallel to the paradigm shifts in 
scientific thought. It is essential that hermeneutical activity be 
sensitive to and make constructive use of the differences and 
developments within and among various historical and cultural 
contexts.20 
One other important thinker whose work supports a 
metaphorical understanding of the contextualist approach to 
hermeneutics is the Harvard philosopher, Nelson Goodman. In his 
delightfully deep little book, Ways of World making , 21 Goodman 
invites us to think of the various worlds we inhabit, such as the 
worlds of science, economics, art, religion, morality, etc. , as the 
result of our collaborative, creative interaction with our 
multidimensional environment. They grow out of each other, 
overlap with each other, and at times conflict with each other. 
These worlds are not fabricated arbitrarily, but arise as we engage 
in various shared activities and purposes. Nevertheless, they 
develop organically out of basic alternative ways of 
conceptualizing reality. This sort of open-mindedness entails, to 
be sure, a kind of relativism, but Goodman insists that this does 
not mean "anything goes." He advocates a "relativism with rigor" 
in order to distinguish truly helpful root metaphors from wild-
eyed word salad. In his own words: 
What I have said so far plainly points to a radical 
relativism; but severe restraints are imposed. Willingness 
to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions 
does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as 
good as short ones, that truths are no longer distinguished 
from falsehoods, but only that truths must be otherwise 
conceived than as correspondence with a ready- made 
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world . Though we make worlds by making versions, we 
no more make a world by putting symbols together at 
random than a carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces 
of wood together at random. The multiple worlds I 
countenance are just the actual worlds made by and 
answering to true or right versions. Worlds possible or 
impossible supposedly answering to false versions have no 
place in my philosophy.22 
v 
What, then, are the potential dividends for religious life and 
understanding of this contextualist hermeneutical stance? Clearly 
such an approach entails a mediational view of revelation. By this 
I mean a view which sees God's activity in the world as mediated 
in and through historical, social and natural processes and events. 
For the Christian faith the notion of incarnation focuses this 
understanding of revelation in an axial fashion. "The Word 
became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld the glory,. .. full 
of grace and truth." The emphasis here is on discerned glory 
amidst the significant dimensions of life , not on supernatural 
intrusions from outer space. Even and especially in Christ we see 
through a glass, darkly. I say "especially" because it is only by 
means of a mediated mode of revelation that God can embody and 
communicate honest love and respect for human decision and 
responsibility, as John Hick has so profoundly made clear.23 
A contextualist hermeneutic will come at the S criptures in a 
similar manner. As a most important mediator of the nature and 
meaning of divine revelation, the texts of the Bible must be 
interpreted in terms of every relevant dimension: historically, 
literarily, culturally, existentially and imaginatively. What they 
meant originally, as best as can be determined , what they have 
meant through the centuries, what they mean to us now, and what 
they may mean to readers now and in the future--all these 
contexts mediate significant meaning, even for one another. The 
focus should be on the various root metaphors in each context and 
on how they function for the people therein, always with an eye 
to what they may yet reveal in our own and other settings. The 
Scripture is a record and interpretation of the community of 
believers' interaction with what they discern as God's activity in 
their midst. Two examples come readily to mind. Martin Luther 
King's interpretation of Israel's approach to the "Promised Land" 
in relation to the cause of Black people in America and the Civil 
Rights Movement was more than mere application, while being 
less specific than simple allegory. It constitutes an exemplary case 
of contextualist methodology. In a similar vein, the Reformist 
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dimension of the Christian Feminist Movement constitutes, in my 
view, a sound contextualist interpretation of Paul's powerful, if 
belatedly understood , remark that "In Christ there is ... no male or 
female" (Galatians 3:28). The true meaning of this remark has 
only begun to dawn on the Christian Church. 
The symbolism and ritual of worship will also be seen in a 
different light as a result of a contextualist hermeneutic. 
Participation in traditional and/ or contemporary worship need not 
be viewed as merely that, but can be appreciated as a mediational 
means of participating in a multidimensional reality, wherein 
significance and value arise through active commitment to and 
involvement with the people and events of one's context. 
Baptism, the saying of the creeds, and the Eucharist, for example, 
are activities we engage in as a community, by means of which we 
accomplish or perform certain tasks or acts, and which function 
as the primordial metaphors for expressing the discernments and 
commitments that lie at the center of our common faith and life. 
This is not to say, of course, that symbols and rituals never 
become obsolete or that fresh ones can never be created. It is 
only to say that such alterations should be effected slowly and 
broadly, and that when they occur they will do so as a result of 
contours of communal needs, values and goals. Although it has 
come as a shock to many Roman Catholics, the reform instituted 
by the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s with respect to 
the liturgy of the Mass strikes me as an excellent example of a 
contextualist interpretation of the worship ritual. It seeks a 
middle ground between past significance and contemporary life, 
without self-destructing into sheer subjectivism. Moreover, such 
reform establishes connections with other dimensions of the 
Christian community, thereby contributing to the unity of the 
Church. Catholic and Protestant dialogue, as well as common 
worship and social action, are no longer simply a dream. 
Finally, theology itself must also be affected by a contextualist 
hermeneutic. The traditional model of theology as a metaphysical 
counterpart to Newtonian science is clearly no longer viable. This 
includes all pontifical theologies, of both the philosophical and 
dogmatic varieties, left and right. Moreover, the individualized 
theologies of the existentialist and deconstructionist brands are of 
little help over the long and broad pull. The theologies most 
attentive to the contextualist motif would appear to be those being 
forged in the socio-political arena on the one hand and those 
working the "New Hermeneutic" field on the other hand. The 
former must be careful to allow for the distinction between the 
mediating context and that which is being mediated, lest the truth 
of revelation be equated with the expedient. The latter must pay 
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increasing attention to developing the logic of language and story 
in a truly metaphoric mode, otherwise we shall once again be 
faced with a no-win choice between objectivism and subjectivism. 
To my mind, the theologian who is doing the most creative, yet 
substantive work in this mode is Sallie McFague.24 Drawing on 
the insights of the likes of Robert Funk and Dan Via, as well as 
insights of many of the thinkers already mentioned above, 
McFague explores the ramifications of approaching theology as an 
activity more akin to aesthetic criticism than to science or 
philosophy. Focusing on the role of parable as central both to 
Jesus's life and work and to the ongoing life of the Church, she 
stresses the "story" character of truth in general, as well as the 
metaphoric and mediational nature of revelation in particular. In 
McFague's words: 
The parables of the New Testament are united by a 
number of characteristics, of which one of the most 
outstanding is their concern with relationships of various 
kinds. What is important in the parables is not who the 
characters are (a static notion) but what they do (a 
dynamic one). The plot is always the heart of a parable, 
what a character or several characters decide in matters 
having to do with their relationships with each other. 
Whether one thinks of the parable of the Prodigal Son, the 
Good Samaritan, the Unjust Steward, or the Great Supper, 
it is relationships and decisions about them that are 
critical. Just as the central Old Testament religious 
language is relational--focused on the covenant between 
God and persons and their way of being in the world in 
community--likewise, if we look at Jesus as a parable of 
God, we have no alternative but to recognize personal, 
relational language as the most appropriate language about 
God. Whatever more one may wish to say about him, he 
was a person relating to other persons in loving service and 
transforming power.25 
The cardinal concern for a contextual, mediational 
understanding of hermeneutics, in addition to its emphasis on 
those factors adumbrated in the foregoing pages, is the 
acknowledgement that whatever truth we possess, we carry in 
"earthen vessels." No truth can be revealed apart from the 
particulars of a concrete context, but no particular context can be 
equated with revealed truth. Mediated meaning must be shared 
both confidently and with humility, a rare and difficult 
combination, but a necessary one. 
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VI 
Permit me a brief "concluding unprofessional postscript." 
have no idea how my initial mentor, Professor Traina, will react 
to the foregoing reflections. On the one hand, my concern to 
allow the scripture to "speak for itself," liberated from the 
tyranny of traditional and/ or parochial agendae, is certainly 
traceable to his tireless and insightful efforts in the courses I took 
with him thirty years ago. On the other hand, he may complain 
that I have collapsed the distinction between interpretation, 
application and correlation. To this I can only answer that this 
distinction must be called into question, not in order to do away 
with it altogether, but in order to do justice to the manner and 
degree to which we are embodied and embedded in the language 
and thought patterns of our own heritage, both traditional and 
contemporary. Although there is no way we can extricate 
ourselves from these webs of meaning in order to be eyeball-to-
eyeball with truth and/ or reality, we can, by acknowledging both 
the limitations and the functional adequacy of our own knowledge 
claims, be confident without being arrogant in our hermeneutica l 
endeavors. It is this circumspect confidence at which a 
contextualist hermeneutic aims--and that toward which Robert 
Traina pointed his students by means of his own example. 
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Pirke 'Abot 1:2 (3) 
and the Synoptic Redactions 
of the Commands 
to Love God and Neighbor 
EUGENE E. LEMCIO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Critical study of Jesus' teaching about love for God and 
neighbor (Matt 22:34-40, Mark 12:28-34, Luke 10:25-28) always 
includes some attention to external evidence for both the form and 
content of the redaction. The point is commonly made that the 
twin commands had already been joined prior to the first century.1 
However, these extra-biblical data are not able to account for 
the synoptists' different renderings of Jesus' teaching; nor do they 
explain how these two commands impinge upon Scripture, cult and 
ethics. Consequently, it is the purpose of this article to argue that 
' Abot 1:2 (3) and its subsequent transmiss ion in Judaism may help 
redaction critics to address these issues2 with greater precision. 
Our procedure will be to describe the phenomena within the 
redactional framework of each Gospel , introduce the pertinent 
"background" evidence, and then attempt to explain the relation 
between them. 
II. GOSPELS PHENOMENA 
The Love Commandments 
In Matthew, Jesus is asked about " the great commandment in 
the law" (22:36). He responds with the deuteronomic injunction 
(6:5) to love God with all of one's faculties, calling this "the great 
and first commandment" (v 38). The command to love one's 
neighbor as oneself (Lev 19: 18) is "like" the first; and upon both 
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all the law and prophets "hang" (or may be derived from both , v 
40).3 In Mark, the scribe's question is more universal in that he 
asks Jesus to identify the commandment which is "the first of all" 
(12:28). After citing the love commands, He declares quite 
absolutely that "There is no other commandment greater than 
these" (v 31). Unique to Mark, however, is the repetition of 
Jesus' response by the scribe (vv 32-33a) who then goes on to 
subordinate "all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" to them 
(v 33b). When, according to Luke, a nomikos asks what he must 
do to inherit eternal !if e (I 0:25), Jesus directs him to find the 
answer in the Law. Jn reply, the expert cites the twin commands 
as " ... a single imperative ... without a connecting link as in Mark 
and Matthew."4 When Jesus urges him to find life by practic ing 
what he knows to be true (v 28), the irrepressible lawyer requests 
a definition for "neighbor" (v 29). There then follows the parable 
of the Good Samaritan, which disallows any boundary- setting 
definition of neighborliness, since one must be prepared to show 
mercy even to an enemy in need (vv 30-37). 
Their Redactional Setting 
Each of these respective emphases regarding scriptural 
revelation, cult and behavior are in part, at least, expressions of 
each evangelist's redactional interests. That Matthew's lawyer 
should ask Jesus about the great commandment in the law (v 36) is 
not surpnsmg. Earlier, this concern to identify the heart of 
revealed religion appears in Matthew's formulation of the " Golden 
Rule" (7: 12) and in Jesus' accusing the religious leaders of 
neglecting the " ... weightier matters of the law: justice, mercy and 
faith" during their scrupulous efforts to tithe even herbs (23:23). 
Likewise, Jesus' response to the lawyer in terms of " law and 
prophets" (that is, the entire scriptural revelation) reflects the 
Matthean idiom in his report of Jesus' mission to fulfill " the law 
and the prophets" (5: 17) rather than abolish them (cf. 7: 12). 
Intriguingly, in the latter instance as well as at 23:23 , these efforts 
to identify the major thrust of Scripture occur within an 
affirmation of the need to observe the minor points, too (5: 18-1 9). 
Mark's concern to make these commands supersede the cultus 
fits with his redactional program also. He gives more attention to 
the debate about ritual cleanliness and dietary scrupulosity at 7: 1-
23 (esp. v 19) than does Matthew ( 15: 1-20). His account of Jesus' 
attitude toward the Temple is also more harsh. Mark alone reports 
that , in His " cleaning" of the Temple , Jesus in effect closed it 
down by preventing the flow of traffic (11:16). Only Mark has 
Jesus citing Isa 56:3-7 to make the point that God had intended to 
make the shrine a place of prayer for all nations , not me re ly fo r 
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Jews (v 17). Finally, the Second Evangelist makes the false 
witnesses at the Sanhedrin's hearing attribute a more negative 
attitude of Jesus toward the shrine. There is no reference to its 
being the "Temple of God" (cf. Matthew 26:61 ). Whereas Jesus in 
Matthew only claims power to destroy it, in Mark He is alleged to 
have promised to destroy it and build one without human effort 
(14:58). 
Luke's stress upon merciful behavior (I 0:28, 37) corresponds to 
his rendering of "Q" material about love for one's enemies in 
6:27-36. The Third Evangelist heightens the stress on "doing 
good" and concludes with the injunction to imitate God's mercy 
(rather than His perfection, as in Matt 5:43-48). 
Finally, one might suggest the following concerns which these 
modifications would have addressed. Matthew's subordination of 
the written revelation to these twin commands would have 
answered questions among his readers about the relation of Jesus' 
teaching to Jewish scripture and tradition. For Gentile Christians, 
confused by Jewish Christians who urged them to perfect their 
faith by dietary and cultic scrupulosity, Mark insisted that love 
for God and neighbor would keep them near to the Kingdom of 
God even if the cult were to be terminated by the Temple's 
destruction. Luke expanded " the neighborhood" to include such 
undesirables as the Samaritan. Although the stricken Jew's 
neighbors (the priest and the Levite) failed to show him mercy, 
the foreigner did. That Jews might mediate salvation to the 
Gentiles is radical enough; but to have the reverse occur, turns the 
world upside down. Such opportunities did occur in the early 
decades when Gentile churches came to the aid of the poor saints 
of Jerusalem (e.g. , I Cor 16:1-3). 
Thus, one can offer an account, based upon internal evidence, 
of the synoptic evangelists' renditions of Jesus' teaching about 
loving God and neighbor. Yet, it might be possible to understand 
them further in the light of certain " background" data. 
III. JUDAISM 
T estaments of the Twelve Patriarchs 
That Jesus was not the first to join the commands to love God 
and neighbor cannot be denied . They appear together in T. l ss. 
5:2, 7:6 and T. Dan. 5:3.5 In no instance, however, are they used 
to subordinate the Law and cultus; nor do they expand the 
boundaries of neighborliness in so radical a fashion.6 
Consequently , the Testaments provide no means of accounting for 
the use which the Gospel writers make of the twin commands. 
Moreover, the usefulness of this material could be minimized by 
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any who would suspect Christian interpolations at this point. But 
such cannot be claimed of the following data. 
Pirke 'A bot 1 :2 ( 3) 
A pronouncement attributed to one Simeon the Just stands at 
the head of Pirke 'Abot. Although Simeon's precise identity and 
date are still debated (ca. 350-200 B.c.E. ),7 the statement in 
question, authentic or not, clearly reflects an outlook possible only 
while the Second Temple stood: 
Simeon the Just was of the survivors of the Great 
Assembly. He used to say, "on three things the World [or 
Age] stands: on the Torah, on the [Temple] service, and on 
deeds of lovingkindness."9 
This formulation by Simeon the Just is so all-embracing that 
Judah Goldin sees it as comprising the pillars " ... fundamental to 
the architecture of classical Judaism."10 Yet, they are even 
broader, for they deal with the fundamentals of religion. R. 
Herford put the matter precisely and succinctly: "The three things 
represent revelation, worship and sympathy, i.e., God's word to 
man, man's response to God, and man's love to his fellow men." 11 
The impact of Simeon's statement was so profound that it 
dominated thinking for several centuries thereafter. Subsequent 
sages, while not directly helpful for our interpretation of the 
Gospels because of their late date, nevertheless show both how 
fundamental was the hold of Simeon's dictum (in that it was 
preserved intact) and how it became adapted to subsequent 
situations. Goldinl2 sees the earliest such adaptation in a tradition 
about R. Jochanan ben Zakkai which is preserved in 'Abot R. 
Nat 4. 13 Whether or not the account is early or authentic, a 
difference in mood with respect to 'Abot 1:2 (3) is evident in the 
request R. Jochanan allegedly made of Vespasian following the 
siege of Jerusalem. He asked only for Jabneh, that he might go 
" ... and teach [his] disciples and there establish a prayer (house) 
and perform all the commandments."14 For Goldin, this 
formulation represents an attempt to deal with the new situation 
by boldly reinterpreting the pillars of Simeon in the aftermath of 
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the War of 66-70 c.E. For the Torah, he made central the study 
and teaching of Torah; as a substitute for Temple worship (now 
impossible) came prayer, or acts like prayer; for deeds of piety, 
the Master prescribed acts of lovingkindness.15 
In another tradition about R. Jochanan ben Zakkai, likewise 
preserved in 'Abot R. Nat. (4 in version A, 8 in B), the sage not 
only makes prayer a substitute for Temple service, he also 
subordinates it with the third element. On inspecting the ruined 
Temple, he comforted the distressed R . Joshua by maintaining (on 
the authority of Hos 6:6) that merciful deeds constitute an equally 
effective, alternative atonement.16 The latter tack is continued by 
R . Nathan himself. After quoting each of Simeon's dicta (version 
A), he expounds the meaning of the pillars seriatim. Once again, 
Hos 6:6 provides the warrants for contending that both the study 
of Torah and the doing of merciful deeds are superior to burnt 
offerings. 17 
Although Simeon's formulation was quoted verbatim through 
the third century,18 an even farther-reaching adaptation occurred 
in the wake of the disastrous wars of 132-135 c.E. In Pirke 'Abot 
l: 18 (19), in a formally parallel comment, this tradition is 
preserved: "Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: 'On three things the 
world stands: on Judgment, and on Truth and on Peace."'19 
According to Jacob Neusner, such a statement " ... clearly represents 
a post-135 revision of no. 2: The Torah now is truth, a 
philosophizing tendency; the Temple service is now replaced by 
justice; and deeds of lovingkindness are replaced by peace."20 
Thus was the legacy of Simeon the Just preserved and adapted 
after 70 c.E. Hos 6:6 played a prominent part in enabling the first 
and third of his "pillars" to subordinate the second when 
momentous historical events required equally decisive theological 
rethinking. Yet, the stream which we have followed had, if we 
interpret and apply the data correctly, another tributary; namely, 
that of other Jews who differed with Simeon about the pillars of 
religion. And it is to them that we now turn. 
IV. 'ABOT AND THE GOSPELS 
In the Gospels, although Hos 6:6 is used to subordinate various 
cul tic practices (Matt 9: 12, 12:7), it is the conjunction of Deut 6:5 
and Lev 19: 18 that subordinates all three of Simeon's pillars. 21 He 
had said that the world (or age to come) stands on the Torah. 
Jesus declared that both the Law and Prophets themselves "hang" 
on the twin commands to love God with one's entire being and 
neighbor as oneself (Matt 22:40). Simeon had maintained that the 
world stands on the Temple service. An unknown scribe 
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subordinated " ... all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" to the 
love commands (Mark 12:33), an analysis which Jesus approved by 
pronouncing him "not far" from the Kingdom of God (v 34). 
Simeon had opined that the world or age to come stands on acts of 
lovingkindness. According to Luke, an anonymous lawyer eager 
to inherit eternal life (or life of the age [to come), Zoe aionios ) 
himself joined these love commands. In the parable of the Good 
Samaritan which follows, Jesus urged him to become a neighbor 
by performing deeds of mercy even to an enemy in need (10:25-
37). So, while for Simeon the foundations of existence now and 
hereafter were the written revelation, its cultic response, and 
merciful interpersonal behavior, the Evangelists portray Jesus and 
one guardian-interpreter of Jewish religion as maintaining point-
for-point that greater even than these is wholehearted, boundary-
transcending love. In other words, my contention is that the 
Synoptic variants, seen against the backdrop of 'Abot 1:2 (3 ), 
portray debates among Jews wherein there is an effort to lay 
deeper or other foundations for ways of being religious that those 
which Simeon the Just had identified. This external evidence 
suggests that there was an earlier, or at least another, reason for 
the shape of these commandments than is usually offered. Both 
kinds of data may enable us to give a richer and fuller account of 
their significance. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Redaction 
Although we argued above that the evangelists' versions of the 
love commands fit their overall redactional purposes, one must not 
suppose that they either reflect an exclusive concern or that they 
are essentially redactional in nature. There is, in fact, a great deal 
of overlap. Like Mark, Matthew is inclined to subordinate cultic 
and ceremonial matters to larger issues. So, he has Jesus invoke 
Hos 6:6 twice in order to criticize religious leaders for preferring 
ceremonial purity to showing mercy towards sinners (9: I 0-12) and 
for condemning innocents while maintaining cultic scrupulosity 
(12:1-7). 
Likewise, Matthew's and Mark's treatment of the encounter 
between Jesus and the rich man bears a striking resemblance to 
Luke's version of the commandments to love. In both instances, 
the quest is for (I) behavior (2) that will eventuate in eternal !if e 
(Matt 19:16, Mark 10:17, Luke 18:18. Cf. Luke 19:25). Both 
relate Jesus' directive (3) to behave mercifully (giving to the poor 
was regarded as a merciful act [Matt 19:21. Cf. 6:2-3 , Mark 
10:21, Luke 18:22)). However, Matthew takes the matter another 
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step by appending ( 4) loving one's neighbor as oneself to the 
Decalogue (v 19. Cf. Luke 10:27). Finally, Matthew insists that 
the disposition towards one's enemy, of the kind exhibited by the 
Good Samaritan, mirrors the way in which God loves; and this 
enables one to fulfill the command to be teleios as He is (5:43-
48).22 Thus, the themes are transredactional ones.23 
Furthermore, their commonality at this level runs deeper if 
one looks at the matter from the perspective of source and form 
criticism. The connections just cited span the triple tradition, 
Matthew and "L," and "Q" and "L." Moreover, they infuse 
logia, apophthegms (specifically, controversy dialogues) and 
parable.24 Therefore, both in content and form, the oral and 
written tradition portrays Jesus as one whose teaching dealt with 
the pillars of religion as these had been formulated by Simeon the 
Just and as they were being debated among religious experts of 
the day.25 
History 
Having pursued these themes beyond their redactional level to 
the tradition which lay behind it, it now becomes necessary to 
press the matter still farther. Does the tradition reflect anything 
of the mind, if not the very words of Jesus? Perhaps the best 
entry into this complex matter lies via the extent of post-Easter 
Christology or soteriology at work.26 One thing seems immediately 
clear. The accounts have not undergone the sort of thoroughgoing 
Christianization that would have made Jesus the hero in each case. 
We recall the strong probability that the two commands had 
already been associated in one branch of Judaism a century and a 
half before. This is reflected in Luke, where it is the lawyer, not 
Jesus, who finds in the love commands the way to eternal life. 
Jesus simply urges him to act on what he has just discovered. 
Furthermore, in Mark, the sympathetic scribe, not Jesus, elevated 
agape over the cultus. Of course, in Matthew and Mark, Jesus 
does appear as the first to subordinate the Law (and prophets) to 
love for God and neighbor. But He emerges as the chief among 
several participants in a debate occurring among Jews and within 
Judaism. 
Perhaps more significantly, relation to Jesus' person is not 
made superior to obeying His teaching here as it is elsewhere in 
the Gospels. For example, in Matthew 19, the wealthy young man 
comes to Jesus for instruction about good behavior that will get 
him a hold on eternal life (v 16). Jesus answers that eschatological 
entry into life rests on keeping the commands, specifically the last 
five of the Decalogue , to which He adds Lev 19: 18, the command 
to love neighbor as self (vv 18-19). In response to the inquisi tor's 
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exemplary record of obedience in every respect, and to his sense 
of incompleteness (ti eti hystero, v 20), Jesus moves him on to 
perfection with the charge to give his earthly treasures to the poor 
in exchange for heavenly ones and to follow Him (v 21 ). None of 
this occurs in Matthew 22. Nor does it in Luke 10:25-27, in an 
analogous circumstance, where, as we saw, it is the interlocutor 
who supplies the answer to his own questions about inheriting 
eternal life . And Mark resists making Jesus (or allowing himself 
to) explain why the scribe, having answered so well in 
subordinating the cult to the love commands, is only near to the 
kingdom of God (10:33-34).27 
Of course, a natural objection will be that such a construct 
requires a harmonistic gestalt for these three versions: either that 
Jesus addressed the issues of Scripture, cult and ethics on a single 
occasion (which the tradition or each evangelist related separatel y) 
or that He spoke to each issue at different moments throughout 
His career. I am not yet prepared to advocate either, nor can I, as 
an historian , rule out either option a priori. Only a more 
thoroughgoing study can say. Whatever the ultimate answers, it 
has perhaps become clearer that future analysis of the synoptic 
versions of Jesus' teaching about loving God and neighbor ought 
to consider the shape and significance of Pirke 'Abot 1:2 (3). 
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Some Observations On 
The New Testament Concept 
of "Witness" 
DONALD G. MILLER 
I 
"Witness" is a significant New Testament word. M artus occurs 
thirty-four times; the verb form martureo appears seventy-nine 
times; the nouns marturia and marturion total fifty-seven uses 
between them. The concept appears sparingly in the Synoptic 
Gospels, but is concentrated in the Johannine literature and the 
Acts of the Apostles. This distribution of its usage suggests that it 
is a vital aspect of the Church's growth from a local Jerusalem 
group to a world-wide movement, and contributed much to the 
propagation of the belief that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of 
God" through which believers found " life in His name" (John 
20:21 ). 
Its importance, however, goes beyond statistical considerations. 
Its importance lies in its meaning, and in its close affinity to the 
nature of the Christian faith as a historic religion. The Christian 
faith dawned on the world as a "light shin[ing] in the darkness" of 
paganism (John 11:5a; see Eph 6:12), with a power that "delivered 
[them] from the dominion of darkness" (Col 1:13a). It came into a 
world filled with "many 'gods' and many 'lords"' (1 Cor 8:5b)--
those of Mt. Olympus and the temples of Rome, and the deities of 
the mystery religions from Egypt such as Isis and Osiris; and many 
philosophies--such as Epicureanism and Stoicism which 
commanded the loyalties of many for whom the ancient gods had 
died. It confronted all this with a simple account of a man named 
Jesus in whom, it was claimed, the one, living eternal God had 
visited the earth. 
Here was something new, something different. The home of 
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the Olympian gods was "shut from the sight of men on earth by 
clouds."' No one ever shook hands with Zeus. No one ever had 
lunch with Jupiter. No one ever rode out a storm in a little boat 
with Isis or Osiris. Those deities never wore sandals. Their feet 
never touched the earth; they were never soiled by the dust of the 
road we walk. But here was a god " who for a little while was 
made lower than the angels," who "share[d] in flesh and blood ," 
who was "made like His brethren in every respect" (Heb 2:9a, 
I 4a, I 7a). This was not mythology, but history; not fairy tale, but 
fact. This was no god " shut from the sight of men by clouds," 
but who was born in the animal stall of an overcrowded inn in a 
little village locatable on a map; who was accessible to both the 
humble and the great; who was a refugee in Egypt; who lived and 
taught on the soil of a Roman province; who had identifiable 
disciples, visi ted identifiable places, ran into trouble with the law 
under an identifiable Roman procurator; who was condemned to 
death, executed and buried by identifiable friends; and appeared 
alive to so me of them following His death and burial. 
What is more, this was not an historically isolated 
phenomenon , appearing out of the blue without background or 
preparat ion. It was vitall y related to a unique series of historic 
events wh ich lay behind it. It was a culmination of two thousand 
years of Jewish history. While other religions were speculating 
about the doings in "the remote heavenly palaces of the gods,"2 
the Jews had been observing Yahweh at work in history. As a 
colleague of mine once remarked , "you never get much heresy 
where the Old Testament is central, because it never allows you to 
get away from history."3 You cannot escape history in the Old 
Testament because it is the record of a historic people and their 
experiences on this planet. It has to do with the Pharaohs of 
Egypt; with Sennacherib, Sargon and Shalmaneser of Assyria; with 
Nebuchadnezzer of Chaldea; and Cyrus of Persia. It records the 
doings of the kings of Israel and Judah, the activities of living 
prophets, the record of whose doings abide until the present. So it 
is natural that the Christian faith should keep its roots deeply in 
history and not allow itself to get airborne into gnostic 
speculations . It is essentially a story of the God who had made 
himself known to the " fathers by the prophe ts," now speaking His 
full and final word "by a Son" (Heb I: I, 2). Christianity is 
basically the story of this Son. As Dr. George Arthur Buttrick 
once said: " In a sense, you can state the Christian faith in six 
words: 'The most wonderful thing has happened."'4 
He re is where "witness" in its primary sense became essential. 
The story must be told by those who had "witnessed" it. The 
elemental meaning of martus is a legal one, where so meone who 
Some Obsuvations On The New Testament Concept of 'Witness" 57 
has observed an event, or heard words spoken, or seen the signing 
of a deed , appears in court to authenticate such. To witness, 
therefore, is to rehearse what one has seen or heard , to verify the 
factuality of something.s It was for this reason that the Gospels 
were written and ultimately selected by the Church as bearing 
essentiall y the "witness" of the apostles, who were described by 
Luke as " eyewitnesses" of the things narrated . The importance of 
this apostolic "testimony" to what had happened was stressed by 
the apostles themselves when, in selecting one to take the place of 
the defected Judas "as a witness to [Jesus'] Resurrection," they 
insisted that he must be "one of the men who have accompanied 
us during all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among 
us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day when He 
was taken up ... " (Acts 1 :21 ). The facts about Jesus were not 
mythological but rather "a narrative [an historic account] of the 
things [the events] which have been accomplished [happened, 
taken place] among us, just as they were delivered [handed down] 
to us by those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses ... " 
(Luke I: I, 2). The "witness" was not just to the Resurrection , but 
to the whole story of things that had happened on Palestinian soil 
in ongoing historic events, to real people. These "witnesses" were 
identifiable human beings, who toiled and sweated over heavy 
water-soaked fishing nets, who both collected and paid taxes, who 
bartered in market-places, some of whom were " dagger men" who 
sought opportunity to dispatch hated Romans or Jewish 
collaborators to the other world--all of whom had behind them 
the two-thousand-year history of a nation struggling against great 
odds for survival in a hostile world, and were not accustomed to 
living on mythical imaginings nor hallucinatory visions. 
The necessity of the historic witness of the apostles to the 
events which had produced the Christian Church was effectively 
illustrated many years ago by Professor H. H. Farmer of 
Cambridge University. He contrasted Christianity as a historic 
religion with a nonhistoric religion such as Hinduism: 
It is theoreticall y conceivable that all the sacred books of 
Hinduism, and every Hindu, might be utterly destroyed , 
and yet substantially the same religion reappear. .. .Indeed it 
would fit harmoniously into the Hindu scheme of thought 
to suppose that if Hinduism vanished today it would 
reappear tomorrow, fifty years, a thousand years hence. 
But were all Christian records and all Christians extirpated, 
Christianity could not recur again . In its occurrence ... 
without a witness, it would flatly contradict all that it had 
always claimed to be. To put it paradoxically, in 
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happening again it would show that it had never, according 
to its own definition of itself, happened at all.6 
Christianity rests on a story of events. If nobody knew the 
events, nobody could be a Christian. For this reason, each 
generation must return to the Scriptures. The Bible will always 
remain central to the Church's witness, for it contains the story 
which brought the Church into being and will continue to nourish 
it to the end. The difference between the apostolic generation and 
all subsequent generations is that they could speak of that "which 
we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have 
looked upon and touched with our hands" (I John 1: I), whereas 
the others must repeat a story at which they themselves were not 
present. The Fourth Gospel points the dividing line between those 
who, like Thomas, had believed because they had "seen" and 
"those who have not seen and yet believe" (John 20:29). 
II 
But the apostles "witness" in yet another sense of the word. 
Strathmann has pointed out that both in classical Greek and in the 
Septuagint, martus and its cognates are frequently used in the 
secondary sense of attestation of truth rather than mere f act .7 The 
"witness" interprets the hidden meaning of observable realities. 
The second Isaiah speaks of Israel as a "witness" to "the people 
who are blind, yet have eyes, who are deaf, yet have ears" (43:8). 
Because Israel knows and believes and understands that " before 
[Yahweh] no god was formed, nor shall there be any after" Him, 
they are to "witness" this to those who know it not. They are to 
interpret to others the meaning of God's action with them. 
Events do not always carry their significance in themselves. 
They must be interpreted. For example, had one, ignorant of 
baseball, been taken to Forbes Field in Pittsburgh in the Fall of 
1960 to see the last game of the World Series, he would have seen 
men, in batting practice before the game, hitting with a wooden 
club a small white sphere which occasionally went over the fence. 
This would have been just an illustration of the mechanical force 
of propulsion over gravity. When, however, in the last of the 
ninth inning, with two outs and the Pittsburgh Pirates behind , a 
little chap named Mazeroski, whose propulsive habits were at best 
questionable, propelled the little sphere over the fence , the 
uninitiated onlooker would not have understood why the crowd 
responded with fits of near insanity. One would have had to 
interpret the event to him to give it any meaning. The incident 
ended the game with a sudden, unexpected reversal of the winning 
side; it installed the Pirates as world champions; it added a fat 
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paycheck to the yearly earnings of the hitter and his teammates, 
and by that much reduced the paychecks of their Yankee 
opponents; it put Pittsburgh on the sports map and caused every 
sports writer in the world to write about it; and it gave habitual 
drunkards a better reason for getting drunk than they had had for 
some time. To understand the significance of an event, it is 
necessary to set it in a context of meaning . 
The necessity of this in the realm of faith may be seen in the 
case of the Ethiopian eunuch who was reading the scroll of the 
prophet Isaiah as his chariot carried him home from a pilgrimage 
to Jerusalem. "Do you understand what you are reading?" asked 
Philip. "How can I," he replied , "unless some one guides 
[explains, teaches) me?" Then we are told, "Philip opened his 
mouth, and beginning with this scripture he told him the good 
news of Jesus" (Acts 8:30ff). The story of Jesus must be 
interpreted. It could be just a story of a starry-eyed young 
Jewish man who fell afoul of the authorities in a good cause and 
found what many reformers have found, that it doesn't pay to 
stick one's neck out too far. Or, it could be the story of the 
coming of the eternal God in a unique, decisive incursion into 
human history, to redeem the world from its thralldom to evil. 
The event itself must be understood in its context of meaning. 
The facts themselves are not enough. 
A recent British writer has fulminated against Edward Gibbon 
as a "pseudo-historian." Of him the writer says: 
Accurate in every statement of his work, there has lived 
no individual writer responsible for a greater volume of 
inferential falsehood .... Following his method, there might 
be compiled with equal regard for fact and disdain of the 
truth, a chronicle of the American continent from the 
sexual shortcomings of transatlantic presidents, fortified by 
an implicit belief in the veracity of the Hearst press.s 
In order to avoid "inferential falsehood," with a high "regard for 
fact" but a "disdain of the truth," the Church set up the canon of 
the Scriptures as the authoritative guide to all future developing 
tradition . In so doing, it did not impart any authority to the 
Scriptures- -it merely recognized the innate apostolic authority of 
the interpretation of the sacred events contained therein, by which 
it had been brought into being and under which its subsequently 
developing tradition was to be controlled.9 Those in the apostolic 
generation , therefore, were the indispensable and decisive 
"witnesses" both to the fact s which underlie our faith and to the 
meaning of those facts for faith. 
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III 
But the "witness" did not stop with that generation. There is 
a broader sense in which all Christians are " witnesses." They 
"echo" the original witness of the apostles by rehearsing the facts 
they recounted and by reiterating the apostolic interpretation of 
those facts. Timothy, for example, was a non-Palestinian Greek 
who never knew Jesus in the Flesh, but Paul counseled him, "Do 
not be ashamed then of testifying to our Lord" (2 Tim I :8a). He 
was obviously free, in his testifying, to go beyond mere 
catechetical repetition of apostolic teaching, but in using his own 
words he was to follow "the pattern of the sound words" which 
he had heard from Paul and to "guard the truth" which had been 
entrusted to him by the Holy Spirit who dwelt within him (2 Tim 
I: I 3f). He was not to create new truth, but to rehearse truth 
which had been entrusted to him by Paul and others. Even Paul, 
although he was a direct witness to the Resurrection by having 
been granted a post-Resurrection appearance of Jesus (Acts 22:6f; 
26: I 2ff; Gal I: I Sf; I Cor 9: l, 15:8), was dependent on the 
"witness" of the other apostles as to the historic facts of our 
Lord's earthly life. When he described the Lord's Supper, he 
could only pass on the tradition he had "received." He speaks of 
receiving it "from the Lord," but the entire passage suggests that 
he does not mean that it had been divinely revealed to him, but 
had come to him through a tradition at the beginning of which 
stands the historical Jesus.10 So the entire Christian community is 
engaged in "witness" as the tradition is received and passed on 
from generation to generation. 
As a guide to the content of what that witness should be, it is 
instructive to examine the New Testament descriptions of the 
apostolic witness . To what, or to whom, were they witnessing? 
What was the content of their testimony? As we have seen , their 
central and unique attestation can be made by subsequent 
generations only in a secondary sense- -by rehearsing their primary 
witness to the Resurrection of Jesus. In Peter's sermon to 
Cornelius, he affirmed that "God raised (Jesus] on the third day 
and made Him manifest, not to all the people but to us who were 
chosen by God as witnesses .. . " (Acts 10:40a; italics mine). Paul 
confirms the uniqueness of the apostolic witness to the 
Resurrection when, in listing the series of post-Resurrection 
appearances, he lists the appearance to him as "last of all" ( I Cor 
I 5:8a); that is, the last in a series after which there are to be no 
more . No emotional experiences, or alleged appearances of the 
risen Christ to sub-apostolic people, therefore, are to be c redited 
as genuine post-Resurrection appearances commensurate with what 
happened to those "who were chosen by God as witnesses" to the 
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Resurrection. We must depend on the apostolic "witness" at this 
point; not subsequent occult experiences. When, therefore, we 
hear of experiences such as that of the late Bishop Pike, who 
apparently having reservations about the apostolic testimony to the 
Resurrection, wanted us to believe in the life beyond because of 
certain occult communications he had with his deceased son, we 
cannot incorporate such experiences into the tradition of genuine 
Christian testimony. They are alien to normative Christianity. At 
this point the apostolic "witness" is final. We are driven back on 
it--or nothing. Subsequent generations can only recapitulate their 
testimony. 
But in echoing the apostolic testimony to Jesus' Resurrection, 
the re-presentation of succeeding generations must include the 
context in which that testimony was made. Granted the fact of 
the Resurrection witnessed solely by the apostles, subsequent 
generations must present along with it the accompanying apostolic 
train of thought. They can, for example, follow Paul in testifying 
to the consequences of failing to believe that Christ has been 
raised; to the significance of Christ's Resurrection as "first fruits" 
of the hope of our own resurrection as His final triumph over 
death; and to the nature of the mystery involved in the "spiritual 
body" which Paul contrasts with the "physical body" we now 
possess (see I Cor 15: l 2f). A part of the apostolic "witness" in 
which subsequent generations may share, too, is found in the 
Lukan setting where the witness to the Resurrection is related to 
its background in the Old T estament Scriptures , with the Suffering 
Servant as the key to understanding the preparation for the event, 
and the consequent implication " that repentance and forgiveness 
of sins should be preached in His name to all nations" (Luke 
24:26f, 44ff). Guidance is found also in Peter's word to Cornelius 
when he insisted that the apostles were commissioned not only to 
"witness" to "all that He did both in the country of the Jews and 
in Jerusalem," and to His "death by hanging ... on a tree," and to 
the fact that "God raised Him on the third day," but also "to 
testify that He is the one ordained by God to be the judge of the 
living and the dead" because "all the prophets bear witness that 
every one who believes in Him receives forgiveness of sins 
through His name" (Acts 10:39ff). This is all part of the apostolic 
"witness" which all subsequent generations must re-present till 
"the last syllable of recorded time." 
But note that this "witness" is always focused on Jesus and 
what God has accomplished through him, not on subjective 
"experience" as an outcome of believing this. Their "experience" 
never became their "gospel." As Paul said, "what we preach is 
not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord ... " (2 Cor 4:5a). Paul 
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rehearsed his experience with the risen Christ on the road to 
Damascus in Acts 22 and 26 in testifying to the fact that Christ 
was alive, in establishing his commission to "be a witness for Him 
to all men" of what he had "seen and heard" (22:15b, 26:16b), and 
in insisting on his status as an apostle (Gal 1:11-2:10); but the 
normal focus of his evangelistic witnessing was not on his own 
experience but on the death and Resurrection of Jesus as the 
fulfillment of the prophetic message of the Old Testament. 
Paul's first recorded sermon in the synagogue at Antioch was 
not a description of his conversion, nor a word about his own 
inner spiritual life. It was a rehearsal of Jewish history from the 
Exodus, through David , to John the Baptist; an affirmation " that 
what God promised to the fathers, this He has fulfilled to us their 
children by raising Jesus"; and the conclusion that "every one that 
believes is freed from everything from which you could not be 
freed by the law of Moses" through the "forgiveness of sins" 
(Acts l3:16ff). In his defense before Agrippa, Paul describes his 
ministry as "testifying both to small and great, saying nothing but 
what the prophets and Moses said would come to pass: that the 
Christ must suffer, and that, by being the first to rise from the 
dead, He would proclaim light both to the people [the Jews] and 
to the Gentiles" (Acts 26:22f). Paul also counseled Timothy: "Do 
not be ashamed then of testifying to our Lord ... who abolished 
death and brought life and immortality to light through the 
Gospel" (2 Tim 1 :5a, l Ob). Timothy was not urged to share with 
his hearers the latest state of his religious emotions, nor the 
content of some spiritual vision he had recently had , nor his own 
ideas about God, nor some alleged word spoken to him by God 
during his morning devotions, but to affirm that God in Christ 
had destroyed man's last enemy--death, and that because of that 
we may be "more than conquerors through Him who loved us," 
from whose love nothing "in all creation can separate us" (Rom 
8:37ff). As Eugene H. Peterson has aptly stated: "When we 
witness we do not unpack the contents of our own emotional 
suitcases for the titillation of voyeurs, we point to what God has 
revealed." 11 
Many who follow the "experience-centered" method of 
Christian witness by continually relating their own experiences of 
grace, claim John Wesley as their mentor. I am wondering how 
correct they are. Although I am not an expert on Wesle y, I have 
read rather widely in his writings, and do not recall one single 
reference to his "Aldersgate" experience save the one description 
of it in his Journal. It did not seem to become his "gospel." And 
when, in many other passages in his Journal, he relates so me 
remarkable instance of providence in preserving him from harm 
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on his countless journeys to preach, there is no evidence that these 
experiences were recounted in his sermons, or used as evangelistic 
tools. It has been said of his sermons that one could develop a 
good systematic theology from them, because they are directed to 
an exposition of the faith rather than rehearsals of his experience 
of the faith. 
P. T. Forsyth made a distinction between "the experience ... of 
redemption" and "the experience of a redeemer. Because it is not 
the sense of the experience that is the main matter, but the source 
of the experience, and its content. It is not our experience we are 
conscious of--that would be self-conscious piety--but it is Christ. 
It is not our experience we preach , but the Christ who comes in 
our experience." 12 One of the rarest and most treasured graces 
possible in Christian experience is genuine humility. The 
humblest man I ever knew would have been surprised if one had 
asked him how he became humble. He would probably have 
answered that he had never thought of himself as humble. It was 
his experience of Christ that made him humble, not his experience 
of humility. And what made him humble was that he was so 
obsessed with Christ, and service to him, that it never occurred to 
him to analyze his own experience, or talk of it. He could not 
have written the bestseller I once heard of, entitled Humility and 
How I Attained It! On the other hand, I think that perhaps the 
proudest man I ever saw was one who argued that God never asks 
anything of us that we are unable to attain. If asked whether he 
really, at all times without exception, kept the second great 
commandment, "Thou shalt love thy love thy neighbor as thyself," 
he likely would have answered "Yes!" 
I once heard Professor Eduard Schweizer, of Zurich, illustrate 
in a lecture the difference between the objective and the 
subjective quality of human experience. He said: "I ask you, 
'What happened at the theater last Friday evening?' If you should 
reply, 'Oh, it was wonderful! I was deeply moved! Chills went 
up and down my spine, my eyes were filled with tears; I have 
never experienced such an exalted mood before in my whole life!' 
I should have to reply, 'But you haven't answered my question. I 
did not ask what happened to you, but what happened at the 
theater?'" If what happened there could produce such a marked 
response, testimony to the response might indeed encourage the 
hearer to go the play to find out for himself, but it would be the 
play itself and not someone else's experience of the play which 
would be crucial. A ware of this, when William Carey was visited 
on his deathbed by his younger colleague, Alexander Duff, and 
Duff recounted the many contributions Carey had made to India 
through his life, Carey replied: "Mr Duff, ... when I am gone say 
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nothing about Dr. Carey--speak about Dr. Carey's Saviour." 13 
This has two important concomitants. First, if one rest one's 
faith on experience rather than the source of his experience, it is 
difficult to know whose experience should be normative. On a 
visit to the Mormon Tabernacle a few years ago, I picked up a 
tract written by a female deep sea diver, accompanied by a very 
enticing photograph. It was her testimony. She had been taking 
instruction in the Mormon faith for some months when suddenly, 
in a deep dive many feet below the surface of the water, the truth 
of the Mormon persuasion was clearly revealed to her and she 
experienced the meaning of life through that revelation in a way 
that solved all her problems and made her a radiant and 
triumphant believer. If one rests one's case on experience, why is 
not her experience as valid as anyone else's? And most certainly, 
the Christian Science appeal rests quite solidly on Mrs. Edd y's 
testimony to her "healing" and on that of subsequent followers . If 
the retelling of religious experiences is the best me thod of 
propagating religious faith, then it would seem that those 
approached would be in the position of consumers influenced by 
advertising who are left to pick and choose that which is most 
appealing. On the other hand, to present the proposal of Jesus 
alongside others, to examine carefully the long history leading up 
to Him in the old Testament, to expose one's self to the appeal of 
His character, claims and teachings in the light of the character , 
claims and teachings of others, along with the apostolic testimony 
to His death and Resurrection (which involve truths claimed for 
no other religious leader), furnishes a more solid basis for belief 
than the states of feelings or the religious experiences claimed by 
His followers. The ultimate question for faith must be: Is He 
trustworthy? Conceivably, under the influence of drugs one could 
have a feeling of emotional euphoria while drowning. On the 
other hand, a young man might experience all the normal 
emotional terror of drowning until he was unconscious, yet be 
saved by a strong swimmer who rescues him, pumps the water out 
of his lungs, and restores him to wholeness. The issue in a 
drowning crisis is not how does one feel, but what is the 
capability of the rescuer? Luther wrote to one in this ve in when, 
eschewing all supports from experience, he rested his hope fully 
on the adequacy of Christ. 
And I, my loving Brentius .. . do use to think in this manner, 
namely, as if in my heart were no quality or virtue at all 
which is called faith or love, but I set all on Christ , and 
say, my formalis justitia, that is, my sure, my constant 
and complete righteousness, in which there is no want or 
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failing, but is as before God it ought to be, is Christ my 
Lord and Savior.14 
Second, Dora Greenwell, in a classic devotional book, The 
Patience of Hope, written over a century and a quarter ago, raised 
the issue of the spiritual uncertainty of a faith which rests on 
subjective experience rather than on Him who is the source of 
that experience. If faith rests on experience, then that faith is 
shaky when the experience cools, and thus one's confidence is put 
at the mercy of one's changing emotional states, or subjected to 
the functioning of the liver or endocrine glands. Greenwell wrote: 
Certain systems lay a pressure upon the subjective side 
greater than the spirit of man is at all times able to bear; 
working out all things from the depths of individual 
consciousness, as if truth were not there at all until they are 
(manifestly) there for us. 
She gently chided Wesley, who though he laudably "felt and 
preached Christ both freely and fully," yet by giving "central 
importance ... to conscious spiritual work in men" tended, in some 
degree, "to withdraw the soul's eye from Christ, to fix it upon 
what is going on within itself."15 
This criticism was based on Wesley's early views, expressed 
frequently but especially clearly in a letter in which he says that 
he insists "in all my writings, and in all my preaching" on a 
subjective assurance, a "perceptible inspiration," of one's standing 
with Christ. 
We mean that inspiration of God's Holy Spirit, whereby He 
fills us with righteousness, peace, and joy, with love to 
Him and all mankind. And we believe it cannot be, in the 
nature of things, that a man should be filled with 
this ... without perceiving it as clearly as he does the light of 
the sun. 16 
Although, as we have seen, Wesley did not use Christian 
experience as the basis of faith, it is clear from these and other 
statements that he used it as evidence of the reality of one's faith. 
If one were not subjectively assured of one's saving relation to 
Christ, it was doubtful whether he or she had such a relationship. 
The evidence for faith that one is reconciled to God does not then 
rest ultimately on what Christ has done, but on one's 
"perceiving ... as clearly as he does the light of the sun" that he is 
filled with "righteousness, peace, and joy" and with "love to 
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[God] and all mankind." 
Dora Greenwell apparently did not know, nor do a good many 
followers of Wesley, that in later years he seemed to recant this 
stern insistence on a subjective assurance. On March 28, 1768, 
when Wesley was sixty-five years of age, he wrote to Thomas 
Rutherforth, Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge 
University: 
I believe a consciousness of being in ... favour ... is the 
common privilege of Christians fearing God and working 
righteousness. Yet I do not affirm there are no exceptions 
to this general rule. Possibly some may be in the favour 
of God, and yet go mourning all the day long. But I 
believe this is usually owing either to disorder of body or 
ignorance of gospel promises. 
Therefore I have not for many years thought a 
consciousness of acceptance to be essential to justifying 
faith. 17 
On March 9, 1782, when Wesley was seventy-nine years of age, he 
wrote to Ann Loxdale, who was having difficulty with her 
Christian experience, complaining "But I am not increasing in the 
divine life": 
That is your mistake . Perhaps you are now increasing 
therein faster than ever you did since you were justified. It 
is true that the usual method of our Lord is to purify us 
by joy in the Holy Ghost and a full consciousness of His 
love. But I have known several exempt cases, and I am 
clearly satisfied yours is one .... 1s 
But even more startling is Wesley's confession to his brother, 
Charles, when he was sixty-three years of age: 
And yet this is the mystery, I do not love God. I never 
did. Therefore I never believed in the Christian sense of 
the word. Therefore I am only an honest heathen, a 
proselyte of the Temple, one of the phoboumenoi ton 
theon ... .I have no direct witness, I do not say that I am a 
child of God .... 19 
Able interpreters of Wesley have attributed this strange statement 
to Wesley's physical condition at the time it was made, brought on 
by overwork and strain.20 To the extent that such an 
interpretation is valid, it would seem to confirm the fact that to 
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the degree that one's confidence of acceptance with God rests on 
subjective experience, to that degree one is put at the mercy of 
his or her physical makeup. 
Wesley was a sufficiently great man to change his mind when 
convinced that he had been mistaken. Apparently, in his 
maturity, through further study of the Scriptures and a deeper 
understanding of the ups and downs of the struggle of faith, he 
discovered , with Luther, that faith rests solely on Christ, and that 
one may be held by Christ even when his own awareness of that is 
dim. I believe he would finally have agreed with Dora Greenwell: 
Happy for us, if Christ can look [at us) and find His own 
image reflected, however faintly; but we must look at Him, 
at the sun in the heavens, not at the sun in the brook, its 
broken and ever-varying reflection. So long as we are 
resting in anything within ourselves, be it even in a work 
of grace, there remains, at least to honest hearts, a ground 
for continual restlessness and continual disappointment. To 
know that we have nothing, are nothing, out of Christ, is 
to know the truth which makes us free. 21 
In this vein, P.T. Forsyth says: 
In your faith you are more conscious and sure of Him than 
you are of your faith. For your faith, you well know, may 
fail Him, but you know still better that He will not fail 
your faith. And you are more conscious and sure of Him, 
as the source and cause of your experience, than you are 
of the experience itself, which you forget to think of. The 
very apostles never asked us to believe their experience, 
nor to believe on the ground of it, but to believe with 
them in Christ. 22 
IV 
There is one further aspect of "witness" in the New Testament 
that should not be overlooked. It is the nonverbal testimony of 
the Christian community manifested by their commitment to the 
truths they profess. The facts on which faith is based, and the 
unique interpretation of the meaning of those facts which faith 
gives, is embodied in a life lived in commitment to those facts and 
the truths they imply. This does not mean that these facts and 
their meaning are irrelevant if not adequately embodied in a 
committed community. If that were so, Christian truth would 
have vanished long ago in the light of the failure of both Israel 
and the Church to embody their faith. The very judgment of God 
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brought on by the lapses, however, is itself a witness that they 
should not have occurred, and God's faithfulness both to Israel 
and the Church is witness to the truth they often fail to embody. 
This is clear in the Old Testament where Israel's survival of the 
judgment of the Exile becomes a "witness" to the nations of the 
God by whom they survived. Israel's very existence after the 
Exile made them "witnesses" to Yahweh's saving purpose and His 
lordship of history (Isa 53:9ff). So the very existence of the 
Christian community, in spite of its lapses and failures and 
weaknesses and denials, bears witness to the God to whom it is 
committed and testifies to the fact that the truth by which it li ves 
is greater than it is. The Church is summoned to live by the faith 
which it professes, and to the extent that its failure to do so is 
willful and blatant, it is under the judgment of God. But the God 
to whom the Church witnesses is greater than it is, and will not 
" leave himself without witness" even when the Church fails Him. 
Years ago I heard Dr. George W. Richards tell of E. Stanley 
Jones asking Gandhi what he would like him to tell the American 
Christians when he visited America. Gandhi replied: "Tell them 
to live their religion ." Dr. Richards remarked that this indicated 
Gandhi's failure to understand the Christian faith. This was a 
modern repetition of the old Pharisaic notion that if all Israelites 
would only keep the law for twenty-four hours, Messiah would 
come. This would place the achievement of God's purpose in the 
hands of men rather than in the will of God. It manifests, too, a 
faulty estimate of the tragedy of the human situation, assum ing 
that by human effort, even on the part of good and devout 
people, the kingdom of God can be established on the earth and 
the ravages of the human condition be overcome. Karl Barth 
frequently quoted the phrase: Die providentia et hominum 
confusione. The providence of God and the confusion, or 
bungling , of people--even good people--accounts for history. The 
purpose of God for humankind is too great ever to be perfectly 
embodied in history, either in the life of individuals or the 
structures of society. Utopians, both secular or sacred , hold out 
false hopes. There will never be a time when we shall not have to 
continue praying, "Thy kingdom come," so long as history lasts. 
The kingdom will come as God's gift in His own way and time. 
Committed persons do not achieve it, but bear witness to its 
co:ning because God is God, and they seek to live now--though 
failing at every turn--in a way that will be commensurate with 
that kingdom when it comes. 
Browning's familiar saying, "A man's reach should exceed his 
grasp, or what's a heaven for?" puts it well . But a genuinely 
believing person keeps reaching and, aware with Paul that he or 
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she is not "already at the goal," presses on "toward the goal for 
the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus {Phil 3: 13 ). 
And even an imperfect effort to live one's faith, to the degree 
that a person is genuinely penitent, is a silent witness to that truth 
which is greater than human achievement. Discerning people can 
distinguish between a willful flaunting of the Christian ideal--the 
fraudulent attitude that says, "let us sin that grace may abound"--
and the authentic failure of a high-minded struggler after 
righteousness. The life-commitment of a believer to the truth he 
or she attests, and the effort in the long history of the Church to 
read the meaning of the judgments of God upon it and to renew 
its life accordingly, are eloquent "witness" to the fact that God is 
at work in the world through His Church and that He speaks to 
"those who have ears to hear." 
John Calvin once suggested that in the liturgy of the Church 
the Gloria in excelsis be replaced by a recital of the Ten 
Commandments, thus witnessing that confessing a true desire to 
live by them would be the best way to glorify God. The supreme 
commitment of life to the glory of God is a mighty witness to 
Him. 
v 
This leads to the ultimate in "witness"--the laying down of 
one's life for God's glory. The New Testament applies the word 
"witness" to Jesus in the laying down of His life {I Tim 6: 13), 
and twice in the Revelation applies it to those who had died 
martyrs' deaths (2: 13, 17:6). This usage of martus became 
customary in the early centuries to designate those who gave their 
lives for the Christian faith, and has now passed into our English 
language as "martyr." This eloquent "witness" of those who died 
for Christ rather than live without Him became one of the most 
effective testimonies to the One for whom they died, and made a 
great contribution to the final triumph of the faith over paganism. 
This was perhaps the most effective witness that could be made to 
the lordship of Jesus, either then or now. 
Such witness is foreign to our present Western experience, but 
it is startling to think that in other parts of the world more people 
have died for Christ in our generation than in any other since the 
Christian era began. I do not refer to those who have died in 
wars ostensibly fighting to save what we think of as Christian 
civilization, but people who have been martyred in cold blood in 
peacetime simply because they dared openly to confess faith in 
Christ. In a world that has grown increasingly secular and pagan, 
where the Church's witness has in many areas been weakened by 
compromise and accommodation to the surrounding culture, the 
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witness of martyrdom may be the means by which the world will 
once more be conquered by the faith. And that sort of witness 
can never be a self-conscious effort to turn persons' attention to 
the one who makes the sacrifice. No martyr expires saying, 
"Look at me and see my courage in dying," but rather silently 
testifies to Him whose "head was crowned with thorns, and that 
face that was spit upon" for him or her. 
One last word. The New Testament makes it clear that no 
"witness" can be effectively made to the world, either by word or 
by !if e, that is not empowered by the Holy Spirit. Conversely, no 
"witness" can be heard or rightly interpreted apart from the aid 
of the Holy Spirit. All our efforts to be or to speak are vain save 
as they are "begun, continued, and ended" in Him. 
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John 20:22, Once More 
ROBERT W. LYON 
According to the Fourth Gospel, on the Sunday evening of the 
Resurrection--on Easter evening--Jesus appears to His disciples 
behind closed doors. After His greeting of peace, He confirms 
His identity by showing them His hands and His side. Then, 
following a commissioning word the text records that "He 
breathed upon them and said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit."' This, in 
turn, is followed by the logion granting authority to the 
community with respect to the promise of forgiveness (John 
20:21-23). 
The question that always arises in the examination of this text 
is how this Easter evening event of the insufflation of the Spirit 
relates to the Pentecost experience recorded in Acts 2: 1- 4. Three 
general types of explanations are commonly offered, though with 
significant variations within these three types. 
To begin with, many speak of two separate bestowals of the 
Spirit: the first one on Easter evening as recorded in the Fourth 
Gospel, and the second at Pentecost as we find in Acts 2. The 
two events are separated by fifty days during which the Ascension 
took place . At first glance this seems to be the most natural 
interpretation. But for those advocating this interpretation , the 
agreement ends immediately. The purpose, meaning and impact 
of the two events are variously explained. Chrysostom (fourth-
fifth century) related John 20 to the forgiveness of sins, while the 
event of Acts 2 empowered the church to perform miracles and to 
raise the dead .1 Others propose that John 20 concerns individuals 
in their relationship to the Father, whereas Acts 2 is characterized 
as ecclesiastical and missionary.2 James M . Boice sees John 20 as 
especially for the apostolate, while Acts 2 is the promised general 
outpouring upon the Church.3 H. B. Swete views the latter 
experience as the sending of the person of the Paraclete , while the 
Easter event meant the "inspiriting" of his life.4 Westcott concurs 
with the distinction set out by F. Godet: John answers to the 
power of the Resurrection, the other to the power of the 
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Ascension.s That is, one brought the grace of quickening, the 
other that of enduement. Regarding the two-fold bestowal, E. C. 
Hoskyns writes, "What the Lord will do invisibly from heaven He 
here does visibly on earth. The mission is inaugurated but not 
actually begun .. .. The actual beginning of the mission lies outside 
the scope of the Fourth Gospel. There remains, therefore, room 
for the Pentecostal outpouring."6 Leon Morris does not define the 
difference between the two events, but says only that John tells us 
of one gift and Luke another.7 J. A. Bengel, followed not 
surprisingly by John Wesley, sees John 20 as transitional and 
anticipatory, an arrha of Pentecost.8 James D. G. Dunn, in a very 
thorough and judicious discussion, concludes that for the 
disciples--and only for them--the baptism of the Spirit (Acts 2) 
"was a second and distinct work of the Spirit in the spiritual 
experience of the first disciples."9 He further delineates the 
distinctions between the two experiences by saying that the former 
enables the disciples to experience the recreative breath of God 
(which, he says, was only possible after the Crucifixion/ 
Resurrection), whereas Acts 2 is the giving of the Spirit according 
to promise and after the Ascension. 
These proposals all have one thing in common, namely the 
recognition that only Acts 2 represents the actual fulfillment of 
the promise first declared by John the Baptist10 and repeated by 
Jesusll that the followers of Jesus would be baptized in the Holy 
Spirit. The particular appeal of this way of interpreting the two 
passages is the way the two accounts by John and Luke dovetail so 
well, thereby removing many historical and other problems. 
A second approach to the two texts was offered as early as the 
sixth century by Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose view was later 
condemned by the Second Council of Constantinople in A.o. 553.u 
It was suggested that in John 20 the disciples did not really have 
an experience of the Spirit. Rather, Jesus acted only figuratively 
and by way of promise. The words were purely symbolic of a 
future gift. The expression was proleptic. For some 
representatives of this interpretation, part of the argument has 
involved the suggestion that the aorist labete equals the future 
though those who advocate this approach would not 
rest their case entirely on that proposal. This understanding of 
John 20 was espoused also in the seventeenth century by Hugo 
Grotiusl3 and a century later by August Tholuck.14 Two more 
recent conservatives have also sought to maintain this position. 
Theodor Zahn suggested that the anarthrous expression pneuma 
hagion points to the symbolic form of the gift. 15 "The symbolic 
event (Ger., Handlung) is, therefore, only a drastic renewing of 
the promise given earlier in words that the exalted Jesus would 
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send them the Holy Spirit."16 In our own time, G. E. Ladd has 
asserted that there was only one gift, the one recounted in Acts 2, 
and that John 20 is "acted parable promissory and anticipatory to 
the actual coming of the Spirit at Pentecost."17 He derives this in 
part from the meaning of John 7:39 that the Spirit could not be 
given until after the Ascension, as well as from the fact that there 
is no evidence that the disciples entered into their mission until 
after Pentecost. 
This second option is particularly attractive because it supports 
all the rest of the New Testament witness that there is only one 
bestowal of the Spirit, though that bestowal is described through a 
variety of metaphors . Those who support this interpretation of 
John 20 tend to view all explanations of the two-fold bestowal as 
artificial, unconvincing and unnecessary. The historicity of Acts 2 
is not challenged. Therefore, John 20 is to be seen as something 
other than an actual bestowal. 
This leads us to the third option, namely, that we have only 
one bestowal of the Spirit upon the disciples and that John 20 is 
the writer's own highly theologized version of Acts 2, what is 
called "the Johannine Pentecost." This view is seldom espoused 
by conservative scholars who tend to view the historical problems 
as insurmountable. On the other hand, it seems to be a view 
assumed as obvious or inevitable by others. C. K. Barrett, 18 C. H . 
Dodd,19 R. H . Fuller,20 C. F. D. Moule, 21 Adolf Schlatter22 and 
Kirsopp Lake23 are representative of those who regard the two 
texts as divergent traditions of the same event, though some would 
see different emphases in each. Alfred Loisy goes a step farther 
when he suggests that John is correcting Luke by substituting the 
Resurrection gift for the Pentecostal gift.24 
To Barrett, it is impossible to harmo nize the two accounts, a 
view which probably explains why few conservatives have 
supported the idea that John and Luke can both be reporting the 
same event. The historical incongruencies are quite obvious: (a) 
the Johannine event takes place Easter evening, whereas in Acts it 
takes place fifty days later; (b) the Johannine bestowal is by the 
risen but not yet ascended Lord, while for Luke the Spirit is given 
after Jesus is seated at the right hand of the Father (2:33 ); ( c) 
Thomas is present in Acts 2 but absent in John 20; and (d) it is 
also quite possible that the hoi mathetai of John 20: 19 refers only 
to the inner circle of the immediate disciples (as at the Last 
Supper) whereas Luke has 120 gathered at Pentecost.is Do these 
incongruencies doom the prospects of this option? We shall come 
back to that question. 
How do we choose from among these three options? To 
resolve the problem of this passage and its relation to Acts 2, we 
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must begin with one fundamental principle of interpretation , 
namely, that we must read John according to John and not through 
Lukan lenses. We cannot impose one author on another; we must 
let John speak for himself. Though we will still have to face the 
task of relating the text of John to that of Acts, we must fi rs t 
read John according to John. 
With this principle in mind, it seems that the second of the 
three options has the least appeal precisely because it is an attempt 
to understand John's text within the framework of Ac ts 2. 
Neither the argument that labete = li!mpsesthe or the suggestion 
that the anarthrous pneuma hagion carries a special s ignificance 
has been convincing. But beyond that, this particular reading of 
the text is not suggested by anything in the text no r by any 
literary, philological or theological feature of the Fourth Gospel. 
It derives entirely from the existence of the account in Acts 2. 
Reading J ohn by itself, as the primitive Johannine community and 
perhaps ot hers might have done, we probably would not even 
propose this explanation of the text. It is proposed entirely in the 
light of Acts 2. Nothing in the text itself would indicate that o n 
that Easter evening the disciples did not receive the Hol y Spirit. 
Perhaps the only thing that commends this option is that it rightl y 
recognizes the witness of the rest of the New Testa ment in 
acknowledging only one bestowal of the Spirit. And it rejects the 
idea that the case of the disciples was different. As we shall see, 
there is another and better way of interpreting the text while 
endors ing the "one bestowal" motif of the New Testament. 
The popularity of the first option , namely, of two separate 
bestowals or experiences of the Spirit, suggests it must be take n 
seriously. It cannot be dismissed simply because it is looked at as 
a necessary approach in view of the desire to preserve the 
authe nticity of the historical narratives of Scripture. This first 
option (two bestowals) is not purely an apology for Sc ripture, 
though for some interpreters this may well be a large part of what 
motivates the ir approach. James D . G. Dunn, who surely has no 
desi re to protect the historicity of the na rratives, cautio usly adopts 
this interpretation.26 Though he acknowledges the real possibilit y 
of the third option, ultimately his conclusion seems to be rooted 
largely , though not exclusively, in John 7:39: "for the Spirit had 
not yet been given , because Jesus had not yet been glorified." 
The sa me theme is conveyed in 16:7; the departure of Jesus is 
important, it is "for your good" because only then can the Spirit 
be gi ven . Though many have argued for an ascension of Jesus 
between 20: 17 and 20: 19, so that the insufflation of verse 22 
would indeed be by the ascended Lord (and so dovetailing with 
Acts 2), Dunn is not persuaded that the Ascension has taken place 
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in John's narrative. Therefore 20:22 cannot be the fulfillment of 
the promises in chapters 14-16. 
Dunn regards 20:22 as the moment of new birth for the 
disciples. This could take place, he maintains, only after the 
Resurrection . He rightly views the disciples as the people of the 
transition between dispensations . In this transition period , he 
identifies three decisive milestones. Prior to the death/ 
Resurrection of Jesus, the Word dominated their experience and 
by it they were cleansed (13: 10; 15:3). But until the Resurrection 
they could not experience new birth, which occurs in 20:22. Then 
in the third milestone at Pentecost they experience the promise of 
the Father. The first milestone, then, is before the death/ 
Resurrection of Jesus; the second, new birth, is after the 
Resurrection when for the first time they become Christians; the 
third, at Pentecost, is when they truly experience the promised 
baptism of the Spirit. This construct of the disciples' experience 
has much to commend it, but it raises several serious questions. 
First, it employs the language and categories of later Christian 
theology to treat the experience of the disciples. Dunn 
acknowledges that from Acts 2:38 on we have only the one 
expe rience of new birth--incorporat ion into the Body of Christ, 
salvation--upon the occasion of receiving, or being baptized in, 
the Holy Spirit. But then he employs the term "conversion" 
(p . 179) and notes that the cleansing spoken of in J 3: I 0 and 15:3 
cannot mean that the disciples were converted. Conversion, he 
affirms, took place in 20:22 at the experience of "new birth ." But 
it is surely a vexing question as to when the disciples were 
converted. As to the metaphor of cleansing, E. P. Sanders has 
noted that in some places in rabbinic literature the term "cleanse" 
means "atone."27 This would suggest some sort of relationship 
between the disciples and Jesus (and the Father), perhaps 
involving forgiveness, reconciliation and other terms more 
associated with Paul. Can one be forgiven , in terms of the new 
dispensation in Christ, and not be a Christian? Further, John 17:9 
suggests that they are Christians before Jesus' death. "I pray for 
them; I am not praying for the world but for those whom you 
have given to me, because they belong to you" [italics mine). In 
addition, the word "already" in 15:3 prevents us from interpreting 
the verse proleptically . Can it be said that people who, through 
the ministry of Jesus, belong to God and who have been cleansed 
by the Word are not in some sense of the word Christians? 
Again, it is said that prior to the death/ Resurrection of Jesus 
the cleansing is by virtue of the Word (dia ton logon), and that 
this is a qualitatively different experience from the new life and 
new birth through the receiving of the Spirit. While it is true that 
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the language of "life" is linked with the Spirit and with the 
Resurrection of Jesus, in which He overturns death and makes 
available the !if e of the age to come, yet at the same time we must 
also draw attention to the fact that John also links "life" with the 
Word. "The words which I have spoken to you are both spirit and 
life" (6:63). Similarly, Peter, speaking for the twelve, says, "You 
have the words of life" (6:68). And throughout the Fourth Gospel 
!if e is linked with believing: whoever believes has eternal life 
(3: 15f, et al.). We cannot say that John links life only with the 
receiving of the Spirit. The almost monumental diversity of 
language and metaphor in John's Gospel prevents us from 
mechanically limiting the concept of conversion and new birth to 
the receiving of the Spirit--even in spite of the exclusive tone of 
3:5. 
Dunn acknowledges (p. 179) that they are believers, but 
believers without having received the Spirit. This seems to put a 
severe limitation on the significance of believing. Dunn is to be 
followed wholeheartedly when he speaks of the entry on the part 
of the disciples into the blessings of the new dispensation as 
"staggered" (p. 182), while at the same time not necessaril y 
supported in his "three milestones" interpretation of the Johannine 
witness. Though not without its own conundrums, it seems much 
better to suggest that those who believed and who followed , who 
had been cleansed by virtue of the Word, who belonged to the 
Father, were indeed what we could today call Christians , that is, 
followers of Jesus. 
We may also add that it is possible to suggest that in some 
nascent sense they may also have had the Spirit, if we cons ider 
John 14: 17, a notoriously difficult text about which to have any 
degree of certainty . To begin with, we run into a text-critical 
problem in determining whether estin (present) or estai (future ) 
represents the primitive text and whether menei should be 
accented as a present or future verb. So, for the three verbs in 
this text we have the possibility of one, two or no future tenses. 
The first one, ginoskete, is clearly present and either of the other 
two, or both , may also be.28 The problem is further compounded 
by the fact that, even if we decide text critically for the present 
tenses, any or all of the three verbs may be regarded as proleptic , 
as futuristic present tenses, so that even with all present tense 
verbs the text might be rendered, "You will know Him for He 
will abide with you and will be in you." Certainly in erchomai in 
verse 18 we have su.ch a futuristic present. Though the latter two 
verbs of verse 17 will remain in doubt, less doubt surrounds the 
first one: "You know him."29 However, R. E. Brown30 and o ther 
commentators prefer the proleptic understanding. Still it may very 
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well be that we can understand the present tense "know" in the 
sense that by virtue of their identification with Jesus and their 
participation in His ministry they "know" the Paraclete, as it 
were, by "proxy." In knowing and following Jesus they also 
know the Spirit by which Jesus performs His miracles (Matt 
12:28). 
If we may appeal to another writer not in the Johannine 
tradition, we note that Luke (10:9, 17) records the disciples as 
performing the same healings and exorcisms. Through their 
following Him they were, might we say, under the umbrella of the 
Spirit. In that sense they do know the Spirit; and in that sense 
they bore witness to the power of the Spirit. None of this accords 
with subsequent Christian experience. Their experience cannot be 
ours, as Dunn says so well. But it is their experience we are 
trying to understand. Because life is connected with the receiving 
of the Word and with believing, it is quite possible to say that the 
disciples "had the !if e of the age to come" prior to the death/ 
Resurrection of Jesus. As we have noted (John 17:9) they are said 
to "belong to the Father." And a certain reading of 14: 17 may 
also allow us to affirm that even before receiving the Spirit (20:22) 
they do indeed know the Spirit--even though, as we have said, 
only by proxy. 
That we should even discuss these matters in these terms 
assumes that John had, or ought to have had, our questions in 
mind. In point of fact it is quite difficult to answer the question 
of when the disciples were "converted." We find no indication 
from his narrative that this question was part of his agenda. 
Other considerations cause us to reject Dunn's "three 
milestones" perspective. He connects the insufflation of 20:22 
with the new birth of the disciples, in accordance with 3:5 and 
6:63 , as well as Genesis 2:7 where emphysao is also used. 
However, our context seems to relate to matters other than life 
and new birth. The preceding verse suggests the motif of this 
appearance to the disciples has to do first with the confirmation of 
His aliveness, but then with mission and the power to carry out 
that mission . "Just as the Father has sent me, I also am sending 
(or, am about to send) you" [emphasis mine]. And the verse after 
the insufflation has to do with the transferring of His own 
authority regarding forgiveness of sins over to them: "Whoever's 
sins you forgive they are forgiven .... " To interpret the 
insufflation as the inbreathing of life, rather than the conveying 
of authority and power, is to do violence to the context. In fact, 
it is remarkable how similar the context here is with that of Acts 
2:4, where the fullness of the Spirit is linked with mission and the 
power to engage in mission (Acts l :8; cf., Luke 24:49). 
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For Dunn and others, the verb enephysesen carries considerable 
weight. It means "to breath into" and is said to carry the idea of 
imparting life. Gen 2:7, which describes God as breathing into 
Adam with the result that he becomes a living being , is cited as 
the inspiration for John 20:22. Concurring support is elicited 
from Ezek 37:9, where the breath of God brings life back into the 
dry bones. On the other side, elsewhere this same Greek verb 
bears a destructive note (Job 4:21; Ezek 21 :26, 22:21). And in 
Tobit 6:8 and 11 :11 it relates to a miraculous recovering of sight. 
So, it does not necessarily mean the imparting of life. 
Furthermore, Michal Wojciechowski has recently brought our 
attention to the Targums of Gen 2:7 in which the breath of God is 
not so much the source of life as of the "word" (Fr., parole).31 
He notes that according to the Targums of Neofiti, of Onqelos and 
of Pseudo-Jonathan , the insufflation of Adam means that he has 
been given the gift of speech. Though these texts are later than 
the New Testament, they may reflect a tradition that ex isted in 
the first Christian century. 
This line of evidence supports one common stream of New 
Testament witness of the Spirit which links the Spirit with speech 
and communication. At Pentecost the gift of speech is obvious . 
So also is the promise in the first chapter of Acts: "You will 
receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you and you 
will be witnesses to me .. . " (v 8). Acts 4:31 concurs: "And all of 
them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak the 
Word of God boldly." Again, Acts 4: "Then Peter, filled with the 
Holy Spirit, said to them" (v 8; cf., Acts 13:9). Though 3:5 and 
6:63 link the Spirit with birth and life, the primary significance of 
the promised gift of the Spirit in chapters 14-16 is that of truth 
and communication. Three times the Paraclete is referred to as 
the "Spirit of Truth." In 14:26 the Spirit will teach them 
everything. In 15:26 He will bear witness to Jesus. He will 
convict the world of sin , righteousness and judgment (16:8). He 
will guide them into all truth (16:13). This is how, we propose , 
John 20:22 must be understood when we see it in the context of 
verses 21 and 23. To interpret the insufflation of 20:22 in terms 
of 3:5 and 6:63 is to ignore its own context. 
One other note: the verb elabete, as Bultmann32 and othe rs 
have noted, is almost a technical term in the early Church for that 
definitive reception of the Spirit which incorporates one into the 
Bod y of Christ (cf., John 1:16; 14:17; Acts 2:38; 8:15 , 17; I Cor 
2:1 2).33 
We suggest , then, that our passage has exactly the same 
theological significance for John's narrative that Acts 2:4 has fo r 
Luke's. In both, the bestowal of the Spirit is linked with mission , 
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power and authority. Both may be seen as the culminative act of 
the incarnate Jesus following His glorification. As C. H. Dodd has 
said, "Accordingly, the gift of the Spirit to the Church is 
represented ... as the ultimate climax of the personal relations 
between Jesus and His Disciples ."34 This is as true of 20:22 as of 
Acts 2:4. 
But what of the historical disparities between the accounts? 
R. E. Brown has noted, "A willingness to neglect temporal 
implications for theological significance is not unusual in John."35 
He adds, "If John's purpose is forgotten, the attempt to dramatize 
in temporal scenes what is sub specie aeternitatis creates 
confusion."36 Historical conundrums abound in the Fourth Gospel. 
But they must be faced in a way that does justice to Johannine 
criteria for "truth" and "gospel." While Dunn would agree up to 
a point, at the same time he reminds us that John's narrative is 
not history gone amuck. "Although we cannot deny John's 
concern to impress a theological scheme on a chronological 
sequence of events, it would not be true to say that the former 
completely ignores and suppresses the latter."37 This caveat is 
important, but so, too, is his acknowledgment. In view of John's 
frequent reference to the coming of the Spirit (7:39 and chapters 
14-16), it is much more likely that John would provide us with an 
account of that bestowal than that he would narrate an otherwise 
not previously mentioned experience. Dunn's suggestion that John 
would know of two bestowals, record the promise of one of them, 
and then narrate the other38 seems less than convincing. Much the 
more natural understanding is that which sees our pericope as the 
fulfillment of that promise which is otherwise so important to 
John's scheme of things. The historical problems are there, as in 
so many sections of this Gospel, but they cannot rule over what 
otherwise seems clearly to be the thrust of John's message. 
The themes of John's Gospel, the terminology, (especially) the 
context, as well as the fact that at every theological point this 
pericope answers to Acts 2:4, all support the view that we do 
indeed have here a Johannine Pentecost. It is a highly theologized 
version of that inceptive experience which gave birth to the 
Church and perfected the work of the incarnate Son.39 
This understanding of the pericope makes it very much the 
culmination of John's record. So we may be permitted to ask one 
more question. Is it possible that at one stage of the production of 
this Gospel it was indeed the end of the text? This is not the first 
time such a question has been asked of the Fourth Gospel. Many 
have suspected that at some point in the process that produced this 
Gospel, 20:30f served as the close and that chapter 21 was added 
either by the author or an intimate colleague. Others have gone 
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even further by pomtmg out various redactional elements 
throughout the Gospel--including dislocations.40 More recently, R. 
E. Brown has offered a thorough assessment of the matter and has 
proposed that the Gospel passed through five stages to reach its 
present form.41 It is not our purpose here to evaluate such efforts 
at reconstructing the history of this Gospel, but only to note the 
common sentiment that more than one hand may have helped in 
producing our Gospel in its present form. At some point in the 
process, then , could our pericope have served as the final words 
of the narrative? 
If we suppose for a moment that this was so, and if we 
compare this pericope with Matt 28: 16-20, we find the similarities 
to be striking. Both record a definitive appearance to the 
disciples. Both include an indication of doubt (Matt 28: 17; John 
20:20). The Great Commission of Matthew is repeated in John (vv 
21-23). The promise of the continued presence of Jesus in 
Matthew corresponds to the bestowal of the Spirit in John . And 
both Gospels, significantly, end with a saying of Jesus rather that 
with some sort of summarizing narrative (Luke) or statement of 
purpose (John 20 and 21 ). E. Bammel finds precedent for this in 
the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs42 and mentions John as 
having the same kind of ending. In fact, Bammel refers to 20:24-
29 as "a first supplement" (Ger., ein erster Nachtrag) .43 Everything 
after 20:23 is anti-climactic and appears to be elaborations of 
resurrection themes, including the element of apostolic doubt 
(20:24ff), the corporeality of the risen Jesus (21: 1 ff) and the 
restoration of Peter (21 : 15ff). 
John 20: l-23 includes all the elements of what we may call 
"the resurrection package": the tomb is found by women to be 
empty on Sunday morning (Matt 28: l ff; Mark 16: 1 ff; Luke 24: l ff; 
John 20: 1 ff); some interpretive word is provided by angelic 
representative(s) (Matt 28:2ff; Mark 16:3f; Luke 24:4ff; John 
20:20); the doubt of the disciples is noted (Matt 28: 16; Luke 24: 11 ; 
John 20:20); the appearance of Jesus to the disciples as a group 
(Matt 28: l 6ff; Luke 24:36ff; John 20: l 9ff); a Great Commission 
(Matt 28: l 9f; Luke 24:47; John 20: l 9ff); and finall y, the promise 
of power for mission through the promised Holy Spirit who will 
continue the Lordship of Jesus within history (Matt 28:20; Luke 
24:49; John 20:22). To be sure, the Resurrection narratives 
include other features such as the attempt in Matthew to bribe the 
people, and in Luke the walk to Emmaus. But the above 
mentioned items represent the core of our Resurrection accounts. 
John 20: 19-23 may well have served as a culminative word , if not 
of this particular Gospel, then of some Vorlage which was 
incorporated at some stage of the redactional process. It is enough 
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to note that nothing is missing from the heart of the Resurrection 
records when Matthew ends as it does, and if John had once 
ended as I have proposed. 
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Matera, Frank J. What Are They Saying About Mark? New York/ 
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987. ix, 115 pp . $4.95 paper. 
ISBN 0-8091-2885-3. 
Frank Matera studied at St. Bernard Seminary, Rochester, NY, 
and the University of Louvain, Belgium, before completing 
doctoral studies in biblical literature at Union Theological 
Seminary, Richmond, Virginia. Professor Matera is known by his 
published Gospel research. He serves as a priest of the 
archdiocese of Hartford and is professor of New Testament at St. 
John's Seminary, Boston. 
Like other entries in the "What Are They Saying A bout... ?" 
series, Matera's work aims to introduce students to the "lay of the 
land"--in this case, in Markan studies. Matera reaches as far 
back as Wrede but concentrates on the key figures in the stud y of 
Mark's Gospel over the last twenty-five years. He revi ews their 
work and attempts to discern the present direction of Markan 
studies in five major areas: (I) se tting, (2) Christology, (3) 
treatment of the disciples, (4) composition, and (5) narrative of 
the Gospel. 
A brief statement of conclusions is followed by endnotes and 
suggestions for further reading ( 44 entries, the earliest from 1959). 
The presentation is consistently clear and non-polemic. While the 
work is aimed primarily at seminary and college students 
beginning serious biblical study, persons with broad acquaintance 
with biblical scholarship will find Matera's stud y useful. Perso ns 
wanting a more exhaustive review of histo ry of Markan studies 
will need to consult a work like Sean P. Kealy's, Mark 's Gospel : A 
History of Its Interpretation (New York/ Ramsey: Paulist Press, 
1982), though Matera's mastery of the interplay between the iss ues 
addressed is superior to Kealy's , in my judgment. 
In Matera's view, Mark is written from and to a Roman 
setting just prior to 70 A.D. by (as well as anyone else) John Mark , 
associated in complex ways with Peter. Charting the immense 
shock waves from Wilhelm Wrede's discovery of the "Mess ianic 
secret," Matera concludes the precise function of this theme in the 
Gospel remains itself a secret. Wrede's most important 
contribution was the insistence that Mark's Gospel is at heart a 
Christological statement, not material for a life of Christ. 
Ultimately stemming from the Wrede agenda, the attempts to 
establish a corrective Christology in Mark have made their greatest 
contribution , says Matera, in demonstrating the centrality of the 
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suffering and death of Jesus to any adequate understanding of 
Jesus in Mark. He doubts an alleged theios aner concep t 
illuminates the problem and questions the ability to reconstruct the 
heresies at which Mark's "correction" would be aimed. In his 
opinion, the efforts usuall y result in an unnecessary polarization of 
the Son of Man/ Son of God themes which are to be seen as 
complementary, not contradic tory. In Matera's view, the secrecy 
motif relates to the theme of the suffering Son of God, the key to 
Mark's royal Christology. 
Matera is unconvinced by those who argue Mark 's treatment 
of the disciples as a polemic. Instead , Mark writes with pastoral 
motives, lead ing his community to "follow Jesus" past the lures 
and dangers of their paga n setting. The disciples' ignorance is 
primaril y due to the fact that they know Jesus only apart from His 
death and Resurrection. 
This introductory work does not intend to elaborate and 
defend at length a position on the Gospel of Mark . But nowhere 
do Matera's basic conce rns appear more clearl y than in hi s 
d isc uss ion of the compos ition of the Gospel, the issue reall y at the 
hea rt of al l the other questions. 
In Matera's judgmen t, the last centur y of Markan scholarship 
has come to an impasse for lack of ev idence. Eve ry chap ter ends 
with a "no consensus" verdict from conventional approaches 
(source, form and redaction criticism) to the Gospel's chief 
ques tions. Matera concludes that it is not now poss ible to identify 
wi th confidence the sources used in the compos ition of Mark . He 
is skeptical of app roaches which in volve overly speculative 
reconstructions, lack convincing external evidence, fragment the 
book, and fail to produce a consensus answer to the basic 
questions rai sed by the Gospel. 
Matera finds the most promising approach in reading the 
Gospel as story, using the tools of the newer literary and 
rhetor ical c riticism. In Matera's mind this does not mean 
abandoning the questions of source, form and redaction. Rather 
he urges focus on a more immediate agenda, the read ing of the 
Gospel and its literary units as wholes as a prerequisite for 
returning to historical questions. But he warns against neglecting 
historica l iss ues in a purely literary study of the text. I think his 
assessment is correc t. 
In my judgment it is particularly fitting that a review of 
Matera's work should find its way into a volume honor ing Dr . 
Robert A. Tra ina. Dr. Traina's work proceeds on premises similar 
to Matera's rega rding the necessity of focusing on the literary 
fo rm of the text as it is and as a whole, and of eschewing 
approaches which f ragment the composition and in volve overly 
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speculative reconstructions as the very framework in which the 
research will proceed. Dr. Traina was doing the "new" literary 
and rhetorical criticism and publishing its theory and results years 
before the terms were brought to biblical studies. 
The impasse documented by Matera is due in part to the 
inclination of biblical studies in the academy to be confined by 
the most recent fad. It remains to be seen whether literary/ 
rhetorical critics will achieve any greater agreement regarding 
major issues in Markan study than those using other methods. 
Here again, Dr. Traina's comprehensive approach to biblical study 
anticipates the problem by incorporating all critical methods 
necessary to understand the text as a whole. If there is any hope 
for consensus, one suspects it is in a convergence of 
methodologies. This is the direction in which Matera's review of 
current Markan studies, his own published work, and that of 
Robert A. Traina point. 
DA YID L. THOMPSON, PH.D. 
Associate Professor of Biblical Literature 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Mann, C. S. Mark: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary. Anchor Bible, vol. 27. Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1986. 714 pp. $20.00. ISBN 0-385-03253-6. 
This is Mann's second contribution to the Anchor Bible series; 
he co-authored, with the late W. F. Albright, the volume on 
Matthew, which appeared in 1971. That volume has generally not 
been well received by the New Testament scholarly community, 
because of its overemphasis upon purely technical matters, its lack 
of attention to theological issues, and its insistence upon the 
priority of Matthew, a view that is overwhelmingly rejected by 
New Testament scholars. 
In the present commentary, Mann continues to argue for the 
minority opm10n regarding synoptic ongms, adopting the 
"Griesbach Hypothesis," which posits that Mark is an abridgement 
of Matthew (the first Gospel to be written) and Luke. This 
understanding of synoptic origins stands over against the 
commonly-held "Two-Source Hypothesis," viz., that Mark was the 
first Gospel, and Matthew and Luke used Mark and a sayings 
source (usually labelled "Q") as the basis for their Gospels. 
Actually, Mann's position is a somewhat modified form of the 
Griesbach Hypothesis, since he allows the possibility of the 
priority of Luke, and even suggests that a radically revised form 
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of the Q theory could find a place in his reconstruction of 
synoptic origins. 
The fact that the Griesbach Hypothesis has not been generall y 
accepted by New Testament scholars leads Mann to engage in an 
extensive defense of the theory. Yet Mann presents virtually no 
new arguments for the Griesbach Hypothesis beyond those put 
forth by W. R . Farmer in his classic work , The S ynoptic Problem . 
These arguments are fraught with as many improbabilities and 
implausibilities now as when they were offered by Farmer in 
1964. The Two-Source Hypothesis remains the theory that best 
explains the relationship between the synoptic Gospe ls, while 
creating the fewest problems. This is not to say, however, that 
the Two-Source Hypothesis does not contain difficulties . In fac t, 
the value of these challenges to the Two-Source Hypothesis is that 
they point to the necessarily tentative and provisional character of 
any critical reconstruction, including one so broadly accepted over 
the past century as the Two-Source Hypothesis . This recognition is 
in part responsible for the recent emergence of lite rary critic ism 
in the study of the Gospels and Acts. 
It is clear that the adoption of the Griesbach H ypothesis has 
far-reaching implications for the interpretation of Mark , including 
such questions as the Sitz im Leben out of which the Gospe l of 
Mark arose, the purpose of the Gospel as reflected in Mar k's 
redactional activity, and the ways in which Mark's redaction of 
Matthew and Luke informs the meaning of individual passages of 
the Gospel as well as the theology of the Gospel as a whole. And 
Mann addresses each of these issues; in fact, this comme ntar y is 
the first major attempt to interpret the Gospel of Mark from the 
perspective of the Griesbach Hypothesis. Unfortunately, the 
answers Mann gives to these questions are less than satisfac tory. 
Mann is convinced that Mark, the auditor of Peter, began the 
compilation of data in Rome, but actuall y wrote his Gospel 
(primarily on the basis of Matthew and Luke) in Palestine 
sometime between A.D. 60-66. He argues that the Gospel best 
suits this setting because (a) its urgency reflects the chaotic 
climate of antebellum Palestine, and (b) the redactional te nde nc ies 
of Mark (esp. chap. 13) assume the state of affairs in the 
Palestinian Christian community during that period . Into this 
situation Mark thrust his Gospel , edited to emphas ize the hope fo r 
the continuation of the Palestinian church, on the basis of the 
victory of Jesus its Lord. 
But Mann's evidence is strained . Neither the note of urgency 
in the Gospel nor the putative redactional movements of Mark 
necessarily point to this setting. Granting Mann's proposal, it is 
difficult to understand why the Gospel of Mark was writte n at all , 
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since Matthew and Luke were already known and used in 
Palestine, and they address the concerns which Mann identifies 
behind Markan redaction. Further, if Mann's reconstruction is 
accurate, Mark omitted many passages from Matthew and Luke 
which speak to these concerns, while bringing over intact 
extraneous material simply because Mark felt bound to the 
tradition. 
Mann's attempt to interpret the Gospel by an examination of 
Mark's redaction of Matthew and Luke is generally not 
productive. The reasons are obvious: the purpose Mann identifies 
behind Markan redaction is too general to inform the specific 
interpretation of individual passages; and Mark's redaction of his 
sources is essentially a redaction of omission, and it is difficult to 
discern theology primarily on the basis of the omission of 
material. 
This massive commentary contains many helpful insights and 
much technical background information. Yet, given the many 
excellent commentaries on Mark, and the tendentious character of 
this volume, most students of Mark would be better served by 
investing in more reliable works. 
DA YID R . BAUER, PH. D. 
Assistant Professor of English Bible 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Achtemeier, Paul J. The Quest for Unity in the New Testament 
Church. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. xii , 132 pp. 
Paper. ISBN 0-8006-1972-2. 
According to Paul J. Achtemeier, professor of New Testament 
at Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, and the 
editor of Interpretation, unity was an ideal to be strived for, not 
attained in the New Testament church as described by Luke in the 
Book of Acts. Luke had only a second-hand knowledge of the 
early church. He reworked his sources, which were fragmentary 
and incomplete , according to his preconceived (biased) theological 
idea about how church deve loped. 
Achtemeier focuses his investigation on the relationship 
between Paul and the Jerusalem leadership. In Galatians 1-2 Paul 
mentions his two visits to Jerusalem. Achtemeier identifies the 
first visit (Gal 1:18-21) with Acts 9:26; and the second (Gal 2:1-
10) with Acts 11: 1-18, when the Jerusalem leadership, under 
Peter, agreed that the Gentiles could become Christians without 
circumcision. Even though Acts did not mention it, Paul was 
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there. He accepted this agreement and was encouraged to carry 
on Gentile missions under such agreement. Later, under the 
influence of James, the Jerusalem leadership imposed the decree 
of the Apostolic Council (Acts 15) upon the Gentile Christians. 
Even though Acts mentions Peter, Paul and Barnabas as 
participating in that Council, in fact they did not. When the 
decree was brought to Antioch, Peter and Barnabas accepted it. 
But Paul considered it to be a breach of the earlier agreement and 
rejected it. This brought about the separation of Paul and 
Barnabas. Contrary to the report in Acts, the decree actually 
caused division in the early church, even in the Gentile missions . 
Everywhere he went, Paul was opposed for his theological 
pos1t10n. Attempting reconciliation with the Jewish Christians, 
Paul made a collection of money among the Gentiles Christians for 
the poor in Jerusalem. This final attempt ended in failure. 
This book is well organized. The argument is easy to follow . 
At each step the author usually spells out the methodology, and 
indicates the next step to follow. Adequate endnoting, including 
those of opposite views, is another helpful feature of the book. 
There are some attractive interpretations of certain biblical 
passages. Some questions, however, can be raised. Achtemeier 
highlights the fact that James informed Paul of the decree of the 
Apostolic Council at their last meeting in Jerusalem (Acts 2 1 :25). 
From this he argues for Paul's absence at the Council. However, 
even if Jam.es knew Paul was present at the Council, it would still 
be natural for him to mention that in the context of Acts 2 1 :25. 
If we take the "we" section of Acts seriously, as many reputable 
sc holars do, then we cannot agree with Achtemeier that Luke had 
only second-hand and very limited knowledge of Paul. If Luke 
traveled with Paul for a while , his presentation of Paul's activities 
would not have been mere speculation or wishful thinking. 
Paul never mentions the decree of the Apostolic Council in his 
epistles. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that he did 
not know about it or resisted it. His treatment of the issue of 
food offered to idols in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 agrees with it in 
principle. Probably his support of the decree was misinterpreted 
by so me as his attempt to please men. So he asked the rhetorical 
question "Or am I trying to please men?" in Gal 1:10. 
If, as Achtemeier claims, "Paul ended his career an isolated 
figure, whose theological emphases were destined for swift decline 
in the decades to follow" (p. 61 ), then why were so many epistles 
of Paul canonized in the New Testament? 
JOSEPHS. WANG, P11.D. 
Professor of New Testament 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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Aune, David E. The New Testament in Its Literary Environment. 
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987. 262 pp. $22.95. 
ISBN 0-664-21912-8. 
Aune's work is the eighth contribution to the Library of Early 
Christianity series edited by Wayne Meeks. The purpose of this 
series is to explore the Jewish and Greco-Roman contexts within 
which the New Testament and early Christianity arose. The high 
quality and practical value of this series has been further 
enhanced by Aune's contribution. 
Aune surveys four types of literature in the Jewish and 
Greco-Roman milieu: biography, historiography, letters and 
revelatory literature, relating them to the Gospels, Luke-Acts, 
Christian letters and apocalypses. One of the added bonuses of 
Aune's presentation is that he does not limit himself to the New 
Testament writings but includes Christian writings of the same 
genres from the second century. 
Aune flies in the face of much twentieth -century New 
Testament scholarship with its strong aversion against classifying 
the Gospels as biographies. His survey of biography in the 
Greco-Roman world reveals a genre characterized by great 
diversity through a coalescence of numerous literary forms and 
even other genres . Having laid a strong foundation through his 
broad representations from ancient biographical writings, Aune 
makes a strong case for the Gospels as biography. 
One feature which somewhat weakens Aune's case, however, is 
his tendency to presuppose the "assured results of critical 
scholarship" regarding the historical reliability of the Gospels. 
Aune seems to subscribe to the theory that the Gospels are largely 
"fictitious" works of the early church and provide little, if any, 
support for knowing the historical Jesus. Even though Aune 
correctly warns that "it is illegitimate to allow theological 
assumptions to determine the results of literary criticism," and 
assumes "that the Evangelists wrote with historical intentions" 
(p. 64), he goes on to state, "To claim that the Evangelists wrote 
biography with historical intentions, then, does not guarantee that 
they preserved a single historical fact . It does suggest that they 
restricted the scope of invention to that appropriate to the 
biographical task as popularly understood" (p. 65). The 
overlooked consideration, which may also contribute to the lack of 
consensus on the genre of the Gospels, is that the Gospels convey 
a unique (divine/human) event which not even the 
most diverse literary genre can adequately contain or convey. 
Such a unique event, of course, would have no antecedents in 
biographical literature except as unhistorical fictions to which it 
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would naturally, but erroneously, be compared. 
Another weakness is Aune's totally unquestioned assumption of 
the Two-Source Hypothesis. He reflects no awareness of the 
recrudescence of the Griesbach Hypothesis which has received 
added impetus with the renewed emphasis upon literary criticism 
in recent years. It seems that Aune would have done himself and 
his readers an even greater service had he reflected upon such 
issues in the light of his excellent portrayal of the literary 
environment of the New Testament. This criticism is generally 
true for the entire scope of the book. Rather than using the 
findings of his study of the literary milieu of the New Testament 
to examine afresh the basic questions of New Testament study , 
Aune presumes results of critical scholarship which are 
increasingly questioned . 
One might question Aune's tendency to presume the fictional 
nature of much of Acts, but he has clearly and, I believe, 
unquestionably demonstrated that Acts falls into the literary genre 
of historiography. This is a healthy balance for the prevailing 
perspective which views Acts primarily as a theological treatise. 
Aune's work with letters is probably the strongest portion of 
the book. Not only does he provide a locus for Christian letters 
within the literature of the Greco-Roman world, but he also 
integrates them with the prevailing conventions of Greco-Roman 
rhetoric and diatribe. One of Aune's strong contributions here is 
to show that rhetorical conventions make it far more difficult to 
assuredly define the opponents of the writer of a New Testament 
letter. What have previously been taken as arguments of 
"opponents" may be nothing more than rhetorical devices used by 
the writer to defend or strengthen the argument. 
Aune's discussion of apocalyptic writings reflects an excellent 
grasp of the leading edge of the field. Unfortunately, however, 
he succumbs to the prevailing socio-literary analysis of apocalyptic 
which allows no room for the possibility of genuine revelatory 
experiences. The book of Revelation, consequently, is seen as one 
more example of Israelite-Jewish and Greco-Roman revelatory 
literature. While it is clear that Revelation utilizes the literary 
style of revelatory literature, should there not be room for the 
possibility that a genuine mystical experience lies behind the 
literature? Aune also accepts the prevailing perspective of 
Revelation as eschatologically oriented without considering the 
possibility that it reflects a vision of the immanence of the 
Kingdom in ongoing history. 
One of the most helpful features of Aune's work, as with the 
entire Library of Early Christianity, is the provision of a list of 
excellent resources for further study, delineated by subtopics for 
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each chapter. One of the most disconcerting f ea tu res stylistically 
is an excessive and intrusive use of parenthetical remarks. 
In spite of its several flaws, Aune's work is required reading 
for any serious student of the New Testament, a task that will be 
not only informative and enlightening, but also stimulating and 
provocative of new insights and understandings. 
M. ROBERT MULHOLLAND, JR., TH.D. 
Professor of New Testament 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Hayes, John H. and Frederick Prussner. Old Testament Theology: 
Its History and Development. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985. 
290 pp. $15.95, paper. ISBN 0-8042-0146-3. 
Frederick C. Prussner is the primary author of this work. He 
died in 1978 before its publication. Prussner served as professor 
of Old Testament at the Candler School of Theology, Emory 
University. The book represents a significant part of his doctoral 
dissertation submitted to the Divinity School of the University of 
Chicago in 1952. It remained the task of John H. Hayes, 
currently professor of Old Testament at Candler, to expand and 
update Prussner's work for publication . 
As the title indicates, the purpose is to trace the historical 
development of Old Testament study from the time of Luther to 
the present. This monumental undertaking is approached by a 
review of more than fifty theologians and an examination of their 
presuppositions and methodological pursuit of the biblical text. 
The scope of the work is far-reaching and inclusive. It elucidates 
the difficulty of speaking of the Old Testament theology at all. 
This is a landmark volume in Old Testament study and 
represents a much needed-treatise in the scholarly arena. Hayes 
and Prussner have attempted to present a fair, unbiased 
description of the various Old Testament academies in as thorough 
a way as possible. Such thoroughness is perceived in the 
treatment that each theological position receives. Not infrequently 
the authors trace and explicate the various precursors that 
influenced a particular Old Testament theological stance. Each 
position is carefully considered within its historical context such 
that the reader is able to determine the forces at work during a 
particular time period and, hence, understand better the process 
and perspectives of Old Testament study. From the emergence of 
Protestant Scholasticism, with its primary concern to make the 
Bible "fit" preconceived dogmatic orthodoxy, Hayes and Prussner 
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demonstrate the evolution of theological thought along a 
reactionary axis: the response of Pietism-Romanticism and 
Rationalism to Scholasticism; the subsequent rise of Hegel's 
Idealism and the conservative response of the early nineteenth 
century. 
The authors retell the story well and illustrate the need for Old 
Testament scholarship to step beyond the bounds of particular 
parochialisms to the wider appreciation of the contributions and 
presuppositions of other perspectives. The major part of the book 
(presumably written by Prussner) indicates a sympathetic, unbiased 
presentation of the material. It seems unfortunate that such an 
engaging approach to the material is deemed unnecessary by Hayes 
in the final section of the book where, time and again, viable 
theological positions are unfairly dismissed and personal interests 
are peddled. 
Old Testament Theology is a much-needed volume. It is 
written competently with much research (as one might expect 
from a doctoral dissertation) and presented in a lucid style which 
makes for interesting reading. Without doubt, this book will be of 
inestimable value both to teachers and students in the academy as 
well as to pastors in the parish, notwithstanding the rather 
unworthy update of the final twenty-five pages . 
ALAN J. MEENAN PH.D. 
Los Angeles, California 


